Dinamika Posisi dan Strategi Negosiasi Indonesia dalam Perundingan Pertanian di WTO Mira Sukmawati

Transkripsi

1 Journal of World Trade Studies Climate Change and Agriculture in Multilateral Trade Negotiations and The Development of Trade Coopertion at Regional Level ISSN: Volume V, Number 2, November 2015 Dinamika Posisi dan Strategi Negosiasi Indonesia dalam Perundingan Pertanian di WTO Mira Sukmawati The Implementation of Competition Chapter of the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement Dian Retno Mayang Sari Climate Change, Labelling, International Standards and The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement: Are They in (Dis)harmony? Michelle Ayu & Joachim Monkelbaan Analisis Perkembangan Integrasi Ekonomi ASEAN Menuju Pemberlakua ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Tahun 2015 Primadiana Yunita

2 Citation This issue may be cited as [2015] Vol 5 No 2 JWTS U Gadjah Mada Copyright Center for World Trade Studies No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or means without the prior written permission of the Editorial Board of the Journal of World Trade Studies

3 Journal of World Trade Studies Published by Center for World Trade Studies Universitas Gadjah Mada Volume V, Number 2, November 2015 Editorial Board Editors Poppy S. Winanti (lead editor) Maharani Hapsari Dedi Permadi Advisory Board Masyhuri (Faculty of Agriculture, Universitas Gadjah Mada) M. Hawin (Faculty of Law, Universitas Gadjah Mada) Nopirin (Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada) Mohtar Mas oed (Faculty of Social and Politics Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada) Mudrajad Kuncoro (Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada) Editorial Assistant Eva Novi Karina Administrative Officers Arifah Purnamasari Ari Seryawati Layout Dimas Wijanarko

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5 Editorial Pada volume ini, Journal of the World Studies menyajikan empat artikel yang mendiskusikan Indonesia dalam negosiasi sektor pertanian di WTO, isu lingkungan dan perdagangan internasional, serta perkembangan kerja sama perdagangan bilateral dan regional. Artikel pertama ditulis oleh Mira Sukmawati berisi tentang dinamika posisi Indonesia dalam perundingan pertanian di WTO. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa dalam memperjuangkan kepentingannya Indonesia menggunakan strategi perundingan integrative. Strategi ini digunakan Indonesia sebagai upaya untuk mengkompromikan dua kepentingan berbeda yang ingin dicapai yaitu mendorong terbukanya akses pasar yang lebih luas namun tetap memperjuangkan penggunaan subsidi domestik dan subsidi ekspor serta perlakuan khusus dan berbeda bagi negara berkembang. Negosiasi integratif ini ditunjukkan Indonesia melalui keterlibatannya dalam koalisi perdagangan yang berbeda, yaitu bergabung dengan Cairns Group yang memperjuangkan akses pasar dan mendorong liberalisasi pertanian dan di sisi lain juga menjadi bagian dari koalisi G- 20 dan G-33 yang memperjuangkan perlakukan khusus bagi negara berkembang. Analisis mengenai implementasi aspek kompetisi di bawah perjanjian bilateral Indonesia dan Jepang dalam kerangka IJEPA merupakan fokus dari artikel kedua yang ditulis oleh Dian Retno Mayang Sari Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjawab pertanyaan utama apakah pelaksanaan ketentuan mengenai kompetisi dalam kerangka IJEPA telah mencapai tujuan yang diharapkan atau tidak. Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa sejak diimplementasikan tahun 2007, ketentuan kompetisi telah mencapai tujuan yang diharapkan. Hal ini terutama tercermin dari kerja sama yang terjalin antara KPPU yang bertanggung jawab mengawasi pelaksanaan kompetisi di Indonesia dengan lembaga serupa di Jepang JFTC dalam hal notifikasi, pertukaran informasi maupun mendorong transparansi. Meskipun demikian, artikel ini juga mengidentifikasi sejumlah persoalan yang terkait dengan jangka waktu notifikasi dan penegakan aturan main yang masih perlu ditingkatkan lagi. Isu mengenai keterkaitan antara perubahan iklim dan perdagangan internasional menjadi topik utama artikel ketiga yang ditulis oleh Michelle Ayu dan Joachim Monkelbaan. Artikel ini menggarisbawahi bahwa perdagangan internasional kerap kali dianggap bertentangan dengan kepentingan perlindungan lingkungan dan tidak Volume V, Number 2, November

6 sensitif terhadap persoalan perubahan iklim. Di samping itu, perjanjian-perjanjian di bawah WTO juga tidak disusun khusus untuk menangani isu lingkungan dan perubahan iklim. Meskpun demikian, artikel ini berargumen bahwa perjanjian TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) dapat diselaraskan dengan kepentingan untuk menangani isu perubahan iklim. Artikel terakhir ditulis oleh Primadiana Yunita menjelaskan alasan yang melatarbelakangi ASEAN tetap melakukan integrasi ekonomi melalui ASEAN Economic Community pada tahun 2015 walaupun prasyarat sebagai komunitas ekonomi belum terpenuhi. Arikel ini menggunakan konsep identitas yang diutarakan oleh Amitav Acharya untuk menjelaskan bahwa keterlibatan dan kepatuhan negara dalam suatu integrasi regional jika tidak berdasarkan pemanfaatan materil yang secara matematis dapat ditentukan, maka integrasi bisa berdasarkan tatanan identitas yang berkembang di antara negara anggota untuk bersepakat mencapai suatu tujuan bersama. Artikel ini memprediksi bahwa ASEAN Economic Community tidak akan menghasilkan perubahan secara materiil terhadap masing-masing negara anggota ASEAN. Akan tetapi dengan mendorong integrasi ekonomi yang dilakukan melalui berbagai kesepakatan serta kerjasama ekonomi dalam perdagangan barang, jasa, ASEAN akan mampu memperkuat identitas kolektifnya. 4 Journal of World Trade Studies

7 Table of Contents 3 Editorial 5 Table of Contents 7 Dinamika Posisi dan Strategi Negosiasi Indonesia dalam Perundingan Pertanian di WTO Mira Sukmawati 25 The Implementation of Competition Chapter of the Indonesia Japan Economic Partnership Agreement Dian Retno Mayang Sari 49 Climate Change, Labelling, International Standards and The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement: Are They in (Dis)harmony? Michelle Ayu & Joachim Monkelbaan 67 Analisis Perkembangan Integrasi Ekonomi ASEAN Menuju Pemberlakua ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Tahun 2015 Primadiana Yunita 84 Submission Guidelines Volume V, Number 2, November

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9 Dinamika Posisi dan Strategi Negosiasi Indonesia dalam Perundingan Pertanian di WTO Mira Sukmawati Abstrak Negosiasi pertanian tidak mudah diselesaikan dalam forum multilateral, utamanya di WTO. Selama perundingan Doha, negara maju, negara berkembang dan negara kurang berkembang terbagi dalam koalisi yang berbeda. Hal ini terjadi karena mereka memiliki posisi yang saling bertentangan satu dengan yang lainnya. Indonesia, sebagai salah satu negara berkembang juga memperjuangkan posisinya untuk menyeimbangkan kepentingannya dalam isu pertanian. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa dalam memperjuangkan kepentingannya, Indonesia menggunakan strategi integrative. Strategi ini digunakan Indonesia sebagai upaya untuk mengkompromikan dua kepentingan berbeda yang ingin dicapai yaitu mendorong terbukanya akses pasar yang lebih luas namun tetap memperjuangkan penggunaan subsidi domestik dan subsidi ekspor serta perlakuan khusus dan berbeda bagi negara berkembang. Negosiasi integratif ini ditunjukkan Indonesia melalui keterlibatannya dalam koalisi perdagangan yang berbeda, yaitu bergabung dengan Cairns Group yang memperjuangkan akses pasar dan mendorong liberalisasi pertanian dan di sisi lain juga menjadi bagian dari koalisi G- 20 dan G-33 yang memperjuangkan perlakukan khusus bagi negara berkembang. Kata kunci: Perjanjian Pertanian, Diplomasi Ekonomi, Koalisi Perdagangan, Indonesia,WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) merupa kan salah satu jenis perjanjian multilateral yang disepakati di dalam WTO. Secara umum, hal ini dilakukan untuk melakukan reformasi perdagangan da lam sektor pertanian sehingga semua produk pertanian dapat bersaing secara bebas. Terdapat tiga pilar utama dalam perjanjian ini yaitu akses pasar, bantuan domestik dan subsidi ekspor. Untuk menyelesaikan isu di bidang pertanian, setiap negara pada akhirnya harus berunding dalam WTO. Namun, isu yang dibahas pun masih terus berkembang sehingga diperlukan perundingan untuk mencapai kesepakatan bersama. Isu pertanian, mulai dari persoalan menentukan tariff lines, batasan bantuan domestik dan subsidi ekspor hingga fleksibilitas pada beberapa bahan pokok pertanian masih terus dirundingkan. Hal ini mengingat terdapat berbagai kepentingan yang berbeda, baik dari negara maju maupun negara berkembang. Hal ini menarik untuk diteliti karena Indonesia memilih untuk ikut berunding dalam menyelesaikan perundingan pertanian dalam tiga koalisi perdagangan yang berbeda, yaitu Cairns Group, G-20 dan G-33. Tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa Indonesia memiliki dua kepentingan domestik yang berbeda. Di satu sisi, In Volume V, Number 2, November

10 donesia mendukung terbukanya akses pasar yang lebih luas, tetapi di sisi lain, Indonesia juga berkepentingan untuk melindungi beberapa bahan pokok pertanian melalui klausul berupa fleksibilitas khusus. Pertanyaan utama dalam kasus ini adalah Bagaimana posisi dan strategi negosiasi Indonesia untuk mengakomodasi dua kepentingan domestik tersebut dalam perundingan pertanian di WTO? Untuk menjawab pertanyaan dari masalah ini, terdapat tiga landasan konsep yang dapat digunakan. Pertama adalah Trade Coalition. Di dalam forum multilateral, negara-negara cenderung untuk membuat koalisi. Menurut John S. Odell, koalisi perdagangan adalah sekumpulan pemerintah yang memiliki kesamaan kepentingan dalam hal produk atau ideologi tertentu (Odell 2006,11). Koalisi perdagangan adalah cara untuk meningkatkan kredibilitas saat pengambilan keputusan di dalam forum multilateral dan memisah koalisi lawan. Dengan berada di dalam koalisi, kepentingan suatu negara akan terwakilkan dan didukung oleh negaranegara lain yang memiliki kesamaan kepentingan. Kedua, yaitu Integrative Negotiation. Menurut Fred C. Ikle, negosiasi adalah suatu usaha untuk mengeksplorasi atau merekonsiliasi posisi konflik aktor-aktor yang berseteru dalam memperoleh jalan keluar yang dapat diterima oleh semua pihak (Cohen 1980,18). Hal ini berarti bahwa negosiasi adalah jalan untuk menyelesaikan suatu sengketa secara damai. Integrative negotiation adalah salah satu strategi negosiasi yang berusaha untuk mencapai tujuan bagi semua pihak. Dasar utama dari strategi negosiasi ini adalah pencapaian tujuan bagi semua pihak tanpa menyebabkan adanya winner dan loser. Negosiator harus menciptakan ruang informasi yang terbuka dan memberikan kesempatan untuk melakukan dialog bersama. Pihak-pihak yang bersengketa setuju untuk memiliki cara pendekatan yang sama untuk mencapai tujuan. Ketiga, yaitu Diplomasi Ekonomi. Diplomasi ekonomi yang dijalankan Indonesia sendiri adalah upaya pemerintah, beserta segenap pemangku kepen tingan yang terlibat dalam suatu kegiatan di bidang ekonomi, yang mencakup perdagangan komoditas, investasi, pariwisata, ketenagakerjaan dan kerja sama teknik. (D.D Soerjanatamihardja et.all 2012,1). Tujuan dan sasaran diplomasi ekonomi adalah mendorong peningkatan kesejahteraan rakyat, mendukung pembangunan nasional, dan memajukan kepentingan Indonesia di kancah global. Agreement on Agriculture sen diri merupakan perjanjian multilateral yang berasal dari hasil kesepakatan dalam Uruguay Round. Ketentuan dalam bidang pertanian ini menjadi bagian tersen diri dalam perundingan tersebut. Hal ini mengingat tujuan yang ingin dicapai adalah upaya membatasi gejala penerap an perlindungan dalam bentuk non-tarif. Kemunculan AoA dipicu karena kecenderungan sistem ekonomi yang lebih tertutup. Negara-negara, khususnya negara maju, cenderung melakukan kebijakan yang proteksionis terhadap sektor pertanian sebelum masa Uruguay Round. Negara-negara berkembang yang memiliki surplus produk pertanian mengalami kesulitan untuk memasuki pasar negara maju, seperti Amerika Serikat dan Eropa, akibat banyaknya hambatan tarif. Subsidi ekspor dan bantuan domestik yang diberikan di negara maju membuat produk pertaniannya lebih kompetitif saat berhadapan de 8 Journal of World Trade Studies

11 ngan produk di negara maju. Kemudian, hal ini memicu negara-negara anggota di dalam WTO untuk menyelesaikan masalah melalui meja perundingan. Perjanjian pertanian dimaksudkan untuk mereformasi perdagangan dunia di sektor pertanian melalui penciptaan aturan yang berlaku bagi semua negara. Hal ini merupakan suatu titik transformasi yang luar biasa mengingat sebelumnya isu pertanian diselesaikan secara bilateral. Pemberlakuan efektif AoA adalah sejak 1 Januari 1995 (WTO 2015). Pada dasarnya, perjanjian ini berlaku dalam periode enam tahun bagi negara maju dan periode sepuluh tahun bagi negara berkembang setelah tahun Bagi negara kurang berkembang atau low developing countries (LDCs), kewajiban ini tidak perlu dijalankan. Terdapat tiga hal pokok dalam perjanjian ini (Sally 2003, 3). Pertama, yaitu tarif. Terdapat proses tarifikasi yang diwajibkan bagi negara-negara anggota yaitu tindakan pemberian kuota dan tindakan non-tarif lainnya dalam ukuran tarif. Negara maju diwajibkan menurunkan tarif rata-rata sebanyak 36 persen pada seluruh produk pertanian atau 15 persen untuk setiap produknya. Bagi negara berkembang, mereka diwajibkan menurunkan tarif sebanyak 24 persen pada seluruh produk pertaniannya atau 10 persen bagi setiap produk. Formula penurunan tarif pada dasarnya masih menjadi bahan perdebatan. Hal ini mengingat munculnya beberapa formula penurunan tarif yang berbeda dari ber bagai koalisi perdagangan. Dalam hal akses pasar, jadwal penurunan tarif telah diberlakukan pada masing-masing anggota sesuai Annex 1 AoA. Kemudian, tindakan-tindakan non-tarif diganti dalam kebijakan tarif dengan tingkat proteksi tertentu. Negara anggota diminta untuk tetap memberikan peluang akses impor yang ditarifikasi pada tingkat minimum sesuai Minimum Acess Volume (MAV). Kedua, yaitu bantuan domestik. Bantuan domestik dihitung dalam skema Total Aggregate Measure of Support (TAM) dengan basis tahun yaitu Bagi negara maju, mereka diwajibkan untuk mengurangi TAM sebanyak 20 persen. Sedangkan bagi negara berkembang, mereka diwajibkan untuk mengurangi TAM sebesar 13 persen. Subsidi domestik sendiri masih terbagi lagi dalam klasifikasi yang lebih rinci. Menurut Pasal 6 AoA, bantuan domestik yang dilarang adalah yang mendistorsi produksi dan perdagangan yang disebut dalam Amber Box (Tim Penulis Dirjen Multilateral 2008, 8). Sedangkan, pada Pasal 6 Ayat 5, subsidi domestik yang termasuk dalam Blue Box, yaitu bantuan domestik yang diperbolehkan dalam syarat-syarat tertentu, masih diperboleh kan. Hal ini ada dalam aturan de minimis yaitu bantuan domestik dalam skala kecil. Total bantuan domestik yang hanya berjumlah lima persen atau kurang dari lima persen dari jumlah total produksi diperbolehkan bagi negara maju. Sedangkan pada negara berkembang, total bantuan domestik yang berjumlah 10 persen atau kurang dari jumlah total produksi juga masih diperbolehkan. Lalu, subsidi yang masuk dalam Green Box, yaitu bantuan domestik yang memiliki pengaruh terkecil atau tidak mempengaruhi perdagangan, Subsidi ini diijinkan asalkan tidak termasuk transfer dari konsumen dan dibiayai pemerintah. Ketiga, yaitu subsidi ekspor. Negara maju diwajibkan untuk mengurangi nilai subsidi ekspor sebanyak 21 persen volume ekspor periode dasar bersubsidi dan 36 persen pengeluaran anggaran Volume V, Number 2, November

12 bagi subsidi ekspor. Bagi negara berkembang, nilai subsidi ekspor dikurangi sebanyak 14 persen dan pengeluaran anggaran dikurangi sebanyak 24 persen. Bantuan domestik dan subsidi ekspor yang diberikan di negara maju diatur dalam klausul perjanjian ini karena ditengarai akan mengakibatkan harga jualnya semakin murah dan mengakibatkan efek dumping di negara tujuan (Ramphul 2011,54). Setelah negara-negara anggota mencapai kesepakatan pada tahun 1995, mereka melakukan perundingan lagi karena masa implementasi berakhir. Bahan perundingan awal AoA yang rupanya berasal dari Blair House Accord menghasilkan jadwal komitmen AoA pada tahun Hasil ini kemudian disepakati dan berlaku sebagai AoA pada tahun Masa implementasi AoA sendiri berakhir pada 31 Desember 2003 (Cunha 2012, 10). Kemudian, tema pokok pembahasan pun berubah karena negara-negara berkembang mulai menaruh perhatian pada ketahanan pangan di negaranya. Basis perjanjian pada tahun yang cukup lama harus diperbarui. Ne gara-negara anggota pun menemukan beberapa praktik yang bertentangan sehingga merasa perlu untuk merundingkan berbagai hal seperti persoalan akses pasar, pendisiplinan subsidi ekspor dan bantuan domestik serta fleksibilitas khusus bagi beberapa produk khusus yang perlu dilindungi untuk negara berkembang. Perundingan Doha sendiri menghasilkan deklarasi Doha yang berisi isuisu pembangunan. Di bidang pertanian, deklarasi ini meminta anggota-anggota WTO untuk melakukan pengembangan substansial di bidang akses pasar, pengurangan segala bentuk subsidi ekspor dan pengurangan substansial dalam bantuan domestik yang mendistorsi perdagangan (WTO 2001). Sesuai alinea nomor tiga belas dalam deklarasi Doha, special and differential treatment adalah bagian integral dalam perjanjian ini dan harus dikeluarkan pada tanggal 31 Maret 2003 serta diserahkan draf jadwal berdasarkan komitmen pada Konferensi Tingkat Menteri ke-5, yaitu di Cancun (Tim Penulis 2008, 17). Akan tetapi, target ini tidak tercapai. Proposal yang dikeluarkan Amerika Serikat dan Eropa justru ditentang oleh negara-negara berkembang. Hal ini karena proposal tersebut menuntut adanya perluasan akses pasar bagi negara berkembang sementara kedua negara ini tidak menurunkan tarifnya (IPSNews 2015). Mereka juga meminta negara berkembang untuk mengurangi subsidi domestik di negaranya. Sementara mereka dianggap melakukan pengalihan bantuan pemerintah yang dikategorisasikan amber box atau blue box, tetapi dimasukkan dalam green box seperti yang dilakukan Amerika Serikat pada akhir tahun 1990-an. Bahkan, subsidi ekspor sudah menghabiskan biaya sekitar 5 juta dolar AS pada tahun 2004, di mana 90 persen praktiknya dilakukan Uni Eropa (Braun et.all 2004,2). Stuart Harbinson, chairman of committee on Agriculture, akhirnya berusaha menengahi perdebatan ini. Ia mengeluarkan draf formula 1 dan 2 Harbinson (Clapp 2006, 9). Pada draf formula pertama, formula yang diajukan adalah formula Uruguay, yaitu formula penurunan tarif se perti Uruguay Round, tetapi menuju adanya harmonisasi tarif. Bahan pertanian yang memiliki bound tariff tinggi akan mengalami penurunan tarif yang lebih besar. Dalam hal subsidi domestik, Harbinson mengusulkan penurunan tariff sebesar 60 persen bagi 10 Journal of World Trade Studies

13 negara maju dan 40 persen bagi negara berkembang. Mengenai bantuan domestik yaitu blue box, pembatasan pemberian direct payment dibatasi hanya sebesar 50%. Kemudian, pada draf kedua, dalam hal penurunan tarif untuk negara berkembang, kuantitasnya diturunkan secara bertahap mulai dari 40, 35, 30, dan 25 persen. Lalu, bagi negara maju masih sama, yaitu mulai dari 60, 50, dan 40 persen. Special Safeguard (SSG) bagi negara maju ditiadakan dan Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) diberikan kepada negara berkembang. Akan tetapi, draf ini pada akhirnya ditentang kedua belah pihak. Kemudian, di tahun 2003, pada KTM ke-5, konsensus tidak dicapai dalam proses perundingan ini. Perundingan ini menunjukkan betapa kompleksnya negosiasi di bidang pertanian. Joint proposal yang digerakkan Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa dianggap hanya berat sebelah dan menggunakan objek negosiasi yang belum dibahas sebelumnya yaitu blended formula. Prinsip konsensus dan single undertaking tidak terpenuhi. Awalnya, Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa mengeluarkan joint proposal yang memuat blended formula. Penurunan tarif akan dilakukan dengan campuran dua metode yaitu formula Uruguay di mana tarif produk pertanian tidak diturunkan secara drastis, formula Swiss di mana beberapa tarif produk pertanian yang tinggi diturunkan secara drastis sementara pada tarif yang rendah tidak diberlakukan dan liberalisasi secara penuh pada produk pertanian yang tersisa sehingga tariffnya dipangkas nol persen. Blended formula tersebut mengundang reaksi dari berbagai pihak sehingga memunculkan koalisi perdagangan baru. G-20 tidak menyetujui karena Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa tidak memangkas bantuan domestik dan subsidi ekspornya. 1 Koalisi perdagangan ini pun mengeluarkan proposal dengan meminta penurunan tarif berupa tiered formula, penghapusan subsidi ekspor, pengurangan blue box serta pemberian SDT hanya bagi negara berkembang. Lalu, koalisi G-33 muncul dengan proposal mengenai SP dan SSM bagi negara berkembang dan negara kurang berkembang. G33 menentang Swiss Formula dan Uruguay Formula.2 SSM dikhususkan bagi negara berkembang. Indonesia pun meminta penurunan secara substansial atau penghapusan subsidi ekspor dan bantuan domestik seperti amber box bagi negara maju serta pendisiplinan green box dan blue box juga harus dilakukan. Hal ini dilakukan Indonesia melalui CAIRNS group. Pada sidang Dewan Umum WTO di tahun 2004, perundingan sedikit mendapatkan titik terang. Kesepakatan dewan umum menghasilkan July Package yang memuat kerangka perundingan 1 G20 adalah koalisi perdagangan yang terdiri dari negara-negara berkembang yang berunding dalam bidang pertanian. Negara-negara tersebut adalah Afrika Selatan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Ekuador, Filipina, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kuba, Meksiko, Mesir, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, dan Zimbabwe. 2 G-33 yang digerakkan oleh Indonesia dan dikenal sebagai Friends of Special Products ini beranggotakan Antigua dan Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, China, Kongo, Kuba, Republik Dominika, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Madagaskar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambik, Nikaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Filipina, Saint Kitts dan Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad dan Tobago, Turki, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia dan Zimbabwe. Volume V, Number 2, November

14 lebih lanjut mengenai DDA. Dalam hal pertanian, terdapat tiga pilar hasil kesepakatan dalam July Package (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia 2015). Pertama, yaitu subsidi domestik. Negara maju diharuskan untuk memotong 20 persen dari total subsidi domestiknya pada tahun pertama implementasi perjanjian. Pemberian subsidi blue box akan dibatasi sebesar lima persen dari total produksi pertanian pada tahun pertama implementasi pertanian. Negara berkembang dibebaskan dari keharusan menurunkan subsidi dalam kategori de minimis asalkan ditujukan untuk membantu petani. Kedua, yaitu subsidi ekspor. Semua subsidi ekspor akan dihapuskan dan dilakukan secara paralel dengan penghapusan elemen subsidi program seperti kredit ekspor, garansi kredit ekspor atau program asu ransi yang mempunyai masa pembayaran melebihi 180 hari. Implementasi penghapusan subsidi ekspor bagi negara berkembang lebih lama. Hak monopoli STE di negara berkembang tidak harus dihapuskan. Aturan perlakuan khusus dan berbeda diperkuat. Ketiga, yaitu akses pasar. Untuk alasan penyeragaman dan pertimbangan perbedaan dalam struktur penurunan tarif, tiered formula akan diberlakukan. SP akan dibuat lebih umum berdasarkan kriteria food security, livelihood security and rural development. Secara umum, July Package memberikan posisi yang menguntungkan bagi negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang. Hal ini karena mekanisme SP dan SSM menjadi framework yang akan dirundingkan dalam negosiasi perundingan selanjutnya. Keuntungan ini tentu merupakan hasil koordinasi yang baik antara berbagai koalisi perdagangan, mulai dari G-20 yang berisi negaranegara berkembang dan G-33 di mana kelompok Afrika yang merupakan negara kurang berkembang juga ikut bergabung. Perkembangan perundingan pertanian selanjutnya muncul dalam KTM ke-6 WTO pada tahun 2005 di Hongkong. Dalam bidang pertanian, terdapat beberapa hal pokok yang disepakati. Pertama, yaitu akses pasar. Konsep SP dan SSM dimasukkan dalam deklarasi sebagai modalitas perundingan. Negara berkembang memiliki fleksibilitas untuk menentukan sendiri (prinsip self designate) banyaknya tariff lines berdasarkan kriteria food security, livelihood security dan rural development. Modalitas di bidang pertanian harus diselesaikan paling lambat 30 April 2006 dan draf jadwal yang komprehensif harus di sampaikan paling lambat 31 Juli Kedua, yaitu subsidi domestik. Jumlah pemotongan bantuan keseluruhan dan bantuan yang mendistorsi perdagangan telah disepakati akan menjadi bagian integral dari kesepakatan. Negara berkembang tanpa komitmen AMS tidak harus mendapatkan pemotongan dalam de minimis dan bantuan keseluruhan. Ketiga, yaitu subsidi ekspor. Batas akhir penurunan subsidi ekspor disepakati sampai dengan tahun State Trading Enterprises dan food aid akan didisiplinkan. Secara umum, negara-negara anggota tidak menghasilkan kesepakatan yang rinci. Mereka hanya menyetujui perihal framework negosiasi selanjutnya setelah mereka menyepakati akan membahas tiga pilar perjanjian tersebut. Kesepakatan rinci belum ditentukan soal bagaimana skema potongan subsidi ekspor. Produk yang masuk dalam kategori produk khusus dan pengukuran kriteria SSM juga belum diatur. Akan 12 Journal of World Trade Studies

15 tetapi, mereka bersepakat untuk merundingkan hal-hal tersebut dalam negosiasi selanjutnya. Negosiasi yang tak henti didorong negara berkembang pada akhirnya mampu membuat lawan negosiasi yaitu Uni Eropa, untuk melakukan kompromi. Mereka menyetujui adanya potongan subsidi domestik seperti yang tertera dalam poin awal di klausul subsidi ekspor. Kemudian, mini ministerial meeting diadakan pada tahun 2008 di Jenewa. Melalui Menteri Perdagangan Mari Elka Pangestu, ia tetap meminta negara maju untuk mengurangi subsidi di negaranya. Peluang ekspor bagi produk pertanian negara berkembang juga harus dibuka luas oleh negara maju. Dalam pertemuan ini, draf rancangan yang dibuat oleh Pascal Lamy ditolak karena hanya mengakomodasi produk sensitif negara maju, tetapi tidak mengakomodasi fleksibilitas negara berkembang. Pada pertemuan ini, negara-negara anggota sulit menemukan kata sepakat. Dalam hal prosedur menaikkan tarif saat impor terlalu tinggi, posisi negara maju dan negara berkembang masih berseberangan. Menurut Amerika Serikat, kenaikan tarif impor yang diajukan Cina dan India sebesar 25 persen saat volume arus impor naik 15 persen tidak lah relevan. Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa kenaikan tariff impor dapat dijalankan saat volume arus impor mencapai 40 persen. Sedangkan, negara berkembang seperti India menolak persentase ini karena dianggap terlalu tinggi. KTM ke-7 diadakan di Swiss pada tahun Beberapa pertemuan pendahuluan dilakukan delegasi Indonesia yang dipimpin Menteri Perdagangan Republik Indonesia pada saat itu, yaitu Mari Elka Pangestu, dengan koalisi perdagangan lain di mana Indonesia menjadi bagian di dalamnya, yaitu di G-20, CAIRNS dan G-33. Di dalam G-20, sebuah komunike dihasilkan dalam pertemuan tingkat menteri yaitu soal state of play dalam putaran Doha. CAIRNS group sendiri menghasilkan komunike bersama tentang pentingnya perdagangan pertanian yang adil dan berorientasi pasar. Hal ini dilakukan dengan menghapus subsidi ekspor pada tahun 2013 dan pembukaan akses pasar yang lebih luas (Kementerian Luar Negeri 2015). Sebagai negara koordinator G-33, Indonesia terus menekankan adanya SP dan SSM bagi negara berkembang. Akan tetapi, KTM ini pada akhirnya tidak menghasilkan kesepakatan apapun Negosiasi pertanian selanjutnya diadakan pada KTM ke-8 WTO pada tahun 2011 di Swiss. Pada pertemuan ini, Direktur Jenderal WTO, Pascal Lamy, mengajak seluruh negara untuk mengedepankan sistem perdagangan multilateral sebagai solusi atas krisis global. Sebelumnya, Menteri Perdagangan RI yaitu Gita Wirjawan menghadiri pertemuan G-20. Dalam kesempatan ini, mereka mendiskusikan tentang state of play dan agenda pembangunan yang ada dalam putaran Doha. Indonesia tetap menyuarakan pentingnya prinsip SP dan SSM bagi negara berkembang. Pada KTM ini, isu pertanian kembali menemui jalan buntu karena tidak tercapainya kesepakatan, baik negara maju maupun negara berkembang. Perundingan pertanian menemukan titik terang pada KTM ke-9 pada tahun Misi Indonesia sebagai tuan rumah pada KTM ini adalah membuka kebuntuan dalam perundingan Doha dan mengembalikan kepercayaan negara-negara pada perundingan multilateral. Pada pertemuan ini, proposal G-33 diajukan dengan berisi dua poin Volume V, Number 2, November

16 utama (The Graduate Institute Geneva 2015). Pertama, yaitu uraian kebijakan pemerintah yang dapat digolongkan sebagai green box. Misalnya saja pada rehabilitasi lahan, manajemen kekeringan hingga program penempatan petani. Kedua, yaitu negara-negara berkembang diizinkan memberikan subsidi domestik dengan membeli produk pertanian dari petani kecil dan menjualnya dalam administered price. Harga ini ditetapkan pemerintah dan berbeda dengan harga pasar pada umumnya. Hal inilah yang ditentang negara maju karena subsidi domestik ini dianggap mendistorsi pasar dan masuk dalam kategori amber box, bukan green box. Indonesia sendiri berkepentingan untuk mendukung proposal ini mengingat terdapat beberapa produk pertanian pokok seperti kedelai, jagung, beras dan gula, yang dapat diproteksi menggunakan jaring pengaman ini. Negaranegara berkembang berpendapat bahwa mereka berhak memberikan bantuan ini untuk tujuan keamanan pangan sehingga dapat membantu kepentingan petani kecil (Chakar dan Mukumba 2004, 9). Mereka tidak dapat dibiarkan bersaing secara bebas mengingat harga produk pertanian dunia semakin tinggi. Akhirnya, perundingan ini menemui titik temu saat Bali Package disetujui. Di menit-menit terakhir perundingan, India yang awalnya cukup defensif kemudian menyetujui adanya interim solution. Di sinilah, Indonesia menjadi interlokutor saat India bersikap defensif melawan Amerika Serikat. Dalam negosiasi perundingan kali ini, Bali Package memuat interim solution bagi isu pertanian yaitu mengenai subsidi domestik (FAO 2015). Negara-negara berkembang diizinkan untuk memberikan subsidi domestik kepada petaninya demi program public stokeholding. Ketentuan ini tidak dapat dipermasalahkan dalam DSU dan hanya dapat diberlakukan hingga tahun Hal ini disebut sebagai peace clause. Hasil ini menandakan pencapaian yang cukup luar biasa mengingat sebelumnya perundingan pertanian belum menemukan titik terang dalam SP dan SSM. Subsidi ekspor pun nampaknya masih menjadi bahan perdebatan yang panjang. Namun, mereka sudah menyepakati kriteria subsidi ekspor yang harus dilaporkan ke WTO. Keterlibatan Indonesia sendiri dapat ditelaah melalui perannya di tiga koalisi berbeda. Pertama yaitu Cairns Group. 3 Tujuan awal Indonesia memasuki koalisi ini adalah untuk memastikan pertanian se bagai bahan perundingan, khususnya dalam hal akses pasar. Bagi negara berkembang dan merupakan eksportir ba han pertanian semasa , Indonesia membutuhkan tempat untuk menyalurkan ekspor bahan pertanian. Pada tahun 2002, Cairns mengadakan 24 th ministerial meeting di Bolivia. Dalam pertemuan ini, Indonesia mengeluarkan proposal mengenai SP dan SSM ke dalam koalisi Cairns. Namun, proposal ini ditolak. Sejak persiapan perundingan KTM ke-5 WTO, Indonesia tetap teguh membawa konsep SP sebagai topik rancangan pembahasan perundingan WTO di Meksiko. Posisi Indonesia masih berada di dalam koalisi ini untuk kepen tingan ekonomis. Hal ini mengingat koalisi ini menjadi forum fasilitasi perdagangan di mana arus ekspor impor pertanian memberi keuntungan tersendiri bagi Indonesia. 3 Cairns adalah koalisi perdagangan di sektor pertanian yang beranggotakan Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Fiji, Filipina, Hungaria, Indonesia, Kanada, Kolombia, Malaysia, Thailand, Uruguay dan Selandia Baru. 14 Journal of World Trade Studies

17 Kedua, yaitu G-20. Koalisi ini muncul pada KTM ke-5 WTO pada 20 Agustus 2003 dimana Brazil sebagai motor penggerak. Indonesia bergabung dalam G-20 pada akhir pertemuan Cancun. Dalam perundingan pertanian, koalisi ini memiliki sumber homogenitas yang sama yaitu soal politik (Messerlin 2004, 4). Pertanian adalah isu penting yang menjadi perhatian dari kebijakan negara-negara berkembang. Koalisi ini menyumbang 60 persen dari populasi dunia, 70 persen petani serta 26 persen dari ekspor pertanian dunia. Negaranegara berkembang menyadari bahwa mereka menarik keuntungan dalam hal liberalisasi perdagangan, hanya saja, terdapat berbagai hal lain yang akhirnya mendorong mereka untuk mengambil posisi perundingan berseberangan dengan negara maju. Koalisi ini memiliki tujuan utama untuk menentang blended formula yang dianggap menguntungkan negara maju. Hal ini mendorong koalisi ini mengeluarkan proposal mengenai tiered formula. Tabel 1. Dinamika Posisi Indonesia dalam Berbagai Koalisi Perdagangan Ketiga, yaitu G-33. Koalisi ini terdiri dari negara berkembang dan negara kurang berkembang yang menuntut keadilan melalui Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) seperti yang tertuang dalam mandat Doha alinea ke-44 bahwa SDT adalah bagian integral dari AoA yang dilakukan demi ketahanan pangan, pembangunan pedesaan dan jamin an penghidupan. Koalisi G-33 yang dikoor Indikator Cairns Group G-20 G-33 Target Menuntut pertanian sebagai bahan perundingan Menuntut akses pasar yang lebih luas di negara maju Tujuan Menempatkan pertanian dalam bahan perundingan Mendapatkan keuntungan ekonomis dari kerjasama pertanian Hasil Negosiasi Menempatkan sektor pertanian dalam perundingan dalam AoA Mendapatkan keuntungan ekonomis dari kerjasama pertanian Meminta skema penurunan tariff dalam tiered formula Menghapus subsidi ekspor di negara maju Mendisiplinkan pengalihan subsidi domestik Menentang subsidi ekspor negara maju Meminta skema penurunan tariff yang lebih adil bagi negara berkembang dan LDCs Merundingkan penurunan subsidi ekspor negara maju secara paralel Mendukung konsep SP dan SSM bagi negara berkembang Menurunkan tariff dalam tiered formula Meminta fleksibilitas dalam AoA secara self designate bagi negara berkembang Menuntut SDT bagi negara berkembang Mendapatkan fleksibilitas bagi negara maju hingga 2017 demi ketahanan pangan, pengentasan kemiskinan dan kehidupan pedesaan Volume V, Number 2, November

18 dinasi oleh Indonesia dan dikenal sebagai Friends of Special Products ini meminta bahwa kriteria SP dan SSM harus ditentukan secara jelas. Kelompok G-33 pun menjelaskan bahwa kriteria penentuan SP dan SSM haruslah secara self declaration atas dasar ketahanan pangan, pe ngentasan kemiskinan dan pembangunan pedesaan. Secara umum, dinamika posisi Indonesia dalam berbagai koalisi perdagangan dapat dilihat pada Tabel 1. Berdasarkan Tabel 1, posisi Indonesia tercermin dalam mencapai kepentingan nasionalnya melalui ketiga koalisi tersebut. Di dalam Cairns Group, Indonesia menuntut pertanian sebagai bahan perundingan di Uruguay Round. Hal ini tercermin dalam AoA yang akhirnya disepakati. Di sini, Indonesia menuntut adanya akses pasar yang jauh lebih luas di negara maju bagi komoditas pertanian dari negara berkembang. Sejak awal keikutsertaannya, Indonesia ingin memastikan bahwa pertanian diatur dalam skema multilateral dalam bahan perundingan. Kemudian, meskipun koalisi ini meminta adanya akses pasar yang jauh lebih luas tanpa mengakomodasikan SDT, Indonesia tetap berada di koalisi ini mengingat Indonesia mendapat keuntungan ekonomis dari forum kerja sama perdagangan komoditas pertanian. Melalui G-20, Indonesia memiliki tujuan bergabung untuk meminta skema penurunan tarif yang lebih adil bagi negara berkembang. Kemudian, Indonesia juga menentang subsidi ekspor yang dilakukan negara maju melalui posisinya dalam koalisi ini. Subsidi ekspor ditentang oleh koalisi ini mengingat subsidi ekspor yang dilakukan oleh negara maju dianggap telah mendistorsi perdagangan dunia. Dalam menjalankan negosiasi sejak KTM ke-5, Indonesia ikut mendukung adanya penurunan tarif melalui tiered approach dianggap lebih menguntungkan bagi Indonesia. Hal ini mengingat tarif antara negara maju dan negara berkembang dibedakan dengan prinsip proporsionalitas. Secara lebih lanjut, target negosiasi yang ingin dicapai adalah penghapusan subsidi ekspor. Namun, negara-negara berkembang harus melakukan kompromi dan menyepakati adanya penurunan tarif yang akan dirundingkan setelah Paket Bali secara paralel. Selain itu, koalisi ini pun mendukung adanya SP dan SSM bagi negara berkembang. Aturan fleksibilitas bagi negara maju berupa SSG ditentang karena fleksibilitas khusus hanya ditujukan bagi negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang melalui SP dan SSM. Kemudian, berdasarkan Tabel 1, di dalam koalisi G-33, sebagai negara koordinator, Indonesia menuntut adanya perlakuan khusus dan berbeda bagi negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang. Target negosiasi yang ingin dicapai sejak Sidang Dewan Umum WTO adalah mengacu pada prinsip self designate. Prinsip ini menekankan bahwa kriteria produk yang masuk dalam penge cualian dalam SP dan SSM bergantung pada kondisi domestik negara bersangkutan. Akan tetapi, prinsip ini ditentang oleh negara maju dan beberapa negara Cairns karena dianggap memiliki kriteria yang tidak terlalu jelas. Melalui berba gai pertemuan internal di dalam koalisi ini, mereka mulai memformulasikan kriteria produk yang masuk dalam konsep SP dan SSM. KTM ke-9 pada akhirnya memberikan hasil negosiasi sementara berupa fleksibilitas khusus hingga tahun Kriteria produk pertanian yang diberi perlakuan khusus dan berbeda ini adalah produk yang di lindungi demi pengentasan kemiskinan, ketahanan pangan dan kehidupan pedesaan. 16 Journal of World Trade Studies

19 Negosiasi pertanian mulai menemukan titik temu pada KTM ke-9 WTO di Indonesia. Melalui hasil komunike yang dikeluarkan usai pertemuan komunike koalisi G-33 pada 2 Desember 2013, kebutuhan atas SP dan SSM harus ditekankan untuk kepentingan rural livelihood, food security dan poverty alleviation (WTO 2015). Meskipun tuntutan mengenai hal ini hanya berlaku dalam masa tertentu, yaitu hingga 2017, konsep mengenai SP dan SSM akhir nya diterima sebagai fleksibilitas yang diterima negara berkembang. Akan tetapi, negara-negara anggota WTO diminta untuk terus bekerja sama mencapai solusi permanen demi kepenting an petani kecil. Sebagai koordinator koalisi ini, Indonesia tidak hanya harus menjamin adanya satu posisi yang sama dalam G-33, tetapi juga harus membawa perjuangan kepentingan koalisi ini agar mendapatkan tempat di forum multilateral WTO. Maka dari itu, koalisi ini juga berkoordinasi dengan koalisi lain yang melihat ekses negatif pemberlakuan AoA seperti koalisi G-20 dan kelompok Afrika. Hal ini berguna dalam negosiasi karena koalisi berkesempatan untuk menekan lawan yang sama yaitu negara maju dengan saling memberikan dukungan. Posisi Indonesia dalam berbagai koalisi ini menunjukkan kepentingan nasional Indonesia. Tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa Indonesia membutuhkan akses pasar yang lebih luas di negara-negara maju bagi komoditas pertaniannya. Akan tetapi, ekses negatif dari liberalisasi pertanian ini meninggalkan masalah bagi negara berkembang dan negaranegara kurang berkembang. Kehidupan pedesaan terancam akibat adanya arus impor yang deras dari komoditas pertanian negara maju. Hal ini pun membuat Indonesia memperjuangkan konsep SP dan SSM demi melindungi kepentingan petani kecil agar tidak kalah dari derasnya arus komoditas pangan pokok impor dari negara lain. Dalam perundingan pertanian ini, Indonesia tentu perlu melakukan negosiasi untuk mencapai kepentngan nasionalnya. Saat melakukan negosiasi, strategi ditujukan sebagai sebuah rencana untuk mencapai tujuan yang ingin dicapai. Strategi negosiasi yang dilakukan Indonesia dapat dijelaskan melalui strategi negosiasi integratif. Integrative negotiation adalah salah satu strategi negosiasi yang berusaha untuk mencapai tujuan bagi semua pihak (Lewiscki et all, 32). Dasar utama dari strategi negosiasi ini adalah pencapaian tujuan bagi semua pihak tanpa menyebabkan adanya winner dan loser. Negosiator harus menciptakan ruang informasi yang terbuka dan memberikan kesempatan untuk melakukan dialog bersama. Pihak-pihak yang bersengketa setuju untuk memiliki cara pendekatan yang sama untuk mencapai tujuan dan memiliki keyakinan akan suatu metode penyelesaian masalah bersama. Mereka berinisiatif untuk menyelenggarakan pertemuan untuk mencari titik temu dengan mengajukan prosedur penyelesaian permasalahan. Dalam integrative negotiation, pihak-pihak yang melakukan perundingan pada dasarnya tidak bersikap kaku dan manipulatif. Mereka berusaha mencari jalan tengah untuk menghasilkan konsesi yang menguntungkan lebih banyak pihak. Terdapat beberapa langkah dalam melakukan strategi perundingan ini. Pertama, yaitu mengidentifikasi dan mendefinisikan masalah. Bagi negara maju maupun negara berkembang terkadang terdapat perbedaan dalam mengkonsepsikan masalah. Maka dari itu, konsepsi masalah harus ditemukan. Lalu, para negosiator dapat mengidenti Volume V, Number 2, November

20 fikasi kebutuhan dan kepentingan kedua belah pihak. Kedua, yaitu menghasilkan alternatif solusi dari masalah. Pihak-pihak yang bersengketa terkadang hanya terpaku pada solusi. Padahal, alternatifalternatif solusi lain juga harus dikembangkan untuk mengantisipasi apabila menemui kebuntuan dalam perundingan. Untuk menghasilkan alternatif-alternatif solusi tersebut, para negosiator dapat menambah sumber daya. Para negosiator dapat pula menemukan banyak isu atau menggabungkan kedua isu sehingga kedua pihak mungkin dapat melakukan trade offs. Pihak pertama mungkin dapat mencapai hasil yang diinginkan pada isu pertama dan pihak lain dapat mencapai hasil yang diinginkan pada isu kedua. Hal yang paling penting adalah menemukan solusi yang dapat menjadi jembatan atas kepentingan dan kebutuhan semua pihak (bridge solution). Ketiga, yaitu mengevaluasi alternatif solusi. Alternatif-alternatif solusi tersebut dicek kembali dan mencari kemungkinan menjadikan solusi-solusi tersebut dalam satu paket. Hal paling penting dalam melakukan evaluasi ini adalah mempertimbangkan kadar kegunaan dan penerimaan pada semua Diagram 1. Dinamika Strategi Negosiasi Indonesia dalam Perundingan Pertanian 18 Journal of World Trade Studies

21 pihak. Kriteria pemilihan solusi ini juga harus disepakati oleh negosiator. Indonesia tidak serta merta menyetujui adanya penurunan tarif drastis. Melalui koalisi G-20, Indonesia mendukung adanya solusi alternatif untuk memberlakukan tiered formula. Keempat, yaitu memilih win-win solution di antara semua pilih an solusi tersebut. Solusi yang dipilih harus dijalankan atas dasar motivasi dan komitmen untuk bekerja sama, bukan saling berkompetisi. Komunikasi pun dikembangkan melalui berbagai cara sehingga semua pihak bisa saling mengklarifikasi informasi dan bertukar pandangan. Negosiator harus bisa meyakinkan bahwa posisinya adalah valid dan dapat menjadi solusi bersama atas suatu masalah. Secara lebih lanjut, dinamika strategi negosiasi Indonesia tercermin melalui berbagai koalisi yang melakukan perundingan pertanian di WTO. Perundingan pertanian yang menghasilkan Agreement on Agriculture bukanlah tanpa peran Indonesia. Indonesia adalah satu dari negara-negara anggota kelompok Cairns yang terus menerus memberikan penekanan pada dunia bahwa pertanian adalah sektor yang harus diperhatikan bersama dan menjadi bahan perundingan. Berdasarkan diagram 1, hal inilah yang menjadi tujuan utama diplomasi ekonomi Indonesia melalui koalisi ini. Koalisi ini akhirnya mampu membuat Uruguay Round menghasilkan persetujuan di bidang pertanian yaitu Agreement on Agriculture. Sebagai bagian dari koalisi ini, Indonesia merasa berkepentingan untuk menjamin sistem perdagangan internasional menghasilkan keuntungan bagi produk pertanian. Hal ini mengingat proteksi negara maju pada sektor pertaniannya pada masa itu memang terlampau tinggi. Dalam perkembangannya, posisi Indonesia di Cairns sendiri tidaklah selalu sama. Memasuki pertemuan KTM ke-5, Cairns yang dimotori oleh Australia, justru memiliki posisi yang sama dengan Amerika Serikat. Mereka menentang konsep SP dan SSM yang diajukan Indonesia di dalam perundingan pertanian. Kriteria konsep ini terbilang sangat subjektif dan tak jelas. Dalam proposal yang diajukan Cairns pun, Indonesia terkadang tidak sependapat. Penurunan tarif ini tidak memandang perlu atas adanya SP dan SSM. Meskipun Indonesia mendapatkan pertentangan, Indonesia tetap menggunakan posisi nya sebagai anggota untuk terus mengikuti pertemuan Cairns. Dengan menggunakan strategi negosiasi integratif, Indonesia terus menjelaskan posisi Indonesia dalam mencapai fleksibilitas khusus bagi negara berkembang dalam berbagai pertemuan kelompok Cairns. Di dalam koalisi ini, Indonesia memiliki kepentingan ekonomis karena Cairns tidak hanya menjadi koalisi perdagangan dalam WTO, tetapi juga sebagai forum kerja sama perdagangan produk pertanian. Dalam berbagai kesempatan pertemuan Cairns pun, Indonesia sebagai koordinator G-33 pun masih mengembangkan komunikasi yang efektif me ngenai kepentingan negara berkembang. Kemudian, menurut diagram 1, Indonesia menentang blended formula yang diajukan dalam joint proposal Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa melalui G-20. Indonesia melihat bahwa penurunan tarif sebesar blended formula yang diajukan negara maju seperti Amerika Serikat dan Eropa akan membahayakan kondisi domestik pertanian di negara berkembang. Hal ini mengi ngat penurunan ta rif secara drastis akan membuat aliran impor semakin tinggi di negara berkembang. Penggunaan tiered formu- Volume V, Number 2, November

22 la yang diperjuangkan koalisi ini dianggap lebih memberikan keuntungan bagi negara berkembang. Terlebih, Indonesia sendiri juga sedang aktif mendorong pentingnya fleksibilitas khusus bagi kepentingan petani di negara berkembang. Melalui koalisi ini, Indonesia menegaskan bahwa negara ini menentang praktik penyimpangan negara maju. Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa dianggap telah berpraktik curang dengan tidak bertindak disiplin dalam memberikan subsidi domestik. Bantuan yang dianggap mempengaruhi harga produksi justru ditaruh dalam green box. Bahkan, Amerika Serikat sendiri bersikap inkonsisten dengan mandat Doha karena memberlakukan Farm Security and Rural Investment Act di mana jagung, sorgum, katun, kedelai, nasi dan gandum menjadi sasaran produk yang dicurangi pemerintah Amerika. Uni Eropa sendiri memberlakukan kebijakan CAP dengan memberikan subsidi pertanian yang tinggi kepada perusahaan agronindustri dan petani di Eropa. Tingkat tarif tinggi bahkan diberikan kepada produk ekspor negara berkembang yang masuk ke Uni Eropa yaitu daging, gula, susu dan keju. Dalam hal subsidi ekspor pun, Indonesia menentang praktik negara maju yang telah mengakibatkan kerugian pada produk pertanian negara berkembang. Hal ini mengingat Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa menjual produk pangan pertanian mereka ke pasaran dunia di bawah harga yang seharusnya. Posisi Indonesia dalam koalisi G-20 ini didasari latar belakang yang sama dengan negara berkembang lainnya. Komposisi koalisi ini sendiri didominasi dengan 60 persen populasi dunia, 70 persen petani dan 26 persen ekspor pertanian. G-20 muncul sebagai middle power di tengah pertentangan negara maju dan negara berkembang. Pilihan Indonesia untuk masuk dalam koalisi ini terbilang tepat karena strategi negosiasi integratif Indonesia dapat dijalankan. Posisinya di G-20 tidak membuat Indonesia mampu mencapai tuntutannya dalam hal SP dan SSM secara mendetail di proposal G-20. Namun, Indonesia melihat bahwa dukungan Indonesia menentang SSG dari G-20 adalah cara yang tepat. Tindakan fleksibilitas tidak perlu ditujukan bagi negara maju, tetapi bagi negara berkembang. Dengan menjadi bagian dari koalisi ini, Indonesia berkesempatan untuk mendapatkan dukungan dalam konsep SP dan SSM sehingga bisa menekan posisi negara maju bersama-sama. Mengenai subsidi ekspor, perjuangan Indonesia pun mendapatkan jalan tengah. Sebuah keputusan dalam Paket Bali yang keluar dalam KTM ke-9 WTO menunjukkan bahwa pengurangan subsidi secara paralel akan terus dilakukan. Posisi Indonesia untuk menuntut pengurangan subsidi ekspor negara maju yang mendistorsi perdagangan dunia mulai menuai hasil. Dalam hal export credit, export credit guarantees or export financing, negara-negara bersepakat untuk terus mendiskusikannya dalam komite pertanian dan KTM ke- 10. Meskipun pada kenyataannya, subsidi ekspor tidak lah dikurangi sesuai Hongkong Ministerial Declaration. Permintaan notifikasi terhadap kebijakan subsidi ekspor semakin jelas. Negara harus menyampaikan berbagai hal mengenai praktik ini ke WTO seperti deskripsi program yaitu termasuk direct financing support, risk cover, government to government credit agreements, dukungan kredit ekspor dari pemerintah dan legislasi terkait, export financing entity, total nilai ekspor produk pertanian yang diberi kredit ekspor, jaminan kredit 20 Journal of World Trade Studies

23 ekspor, nilai rata-rata subsidi ekspor ini per tahun dan tujuan destinasi harus dilaporkan ke WTO (WTO 2015). Berdasarkan diagram 1, sebagai koordinator di dalam koalisi G-33, tujuan Indonesia sangatlah jelas dalam memperjuangkan fleksibilitas khusus bagi negara berkembang. Awalnya, Indonesia telah terlebih dahulu mengusulkan proposal mengenai SP dalam pertemuan tingkat menteri Cairns ke-24 di Bolivia. Namun, proposal ini ditolak. Pada KTM ke-5 WTO, Indonesia mengajukan proposal pertama melalui Food Security Mechanism di mana negaranegara berkembang meminta fleksibilitas dalam produk tertentu demi ketahanan pangan. Konsep mengenai hal ini kemudian berkembang menjadi SP pada proposal kedua. Koalisi ini akhirnya muncul sebagai reaksi atas KTM ke-5 WTO yang tidak memenuhi kepentingan negara berkembang dalam hal SP. Target Indonesia dalam koalisi ini adalah untuk memenuhi fleksibilitas khusus melalui konsep SP dan SSM berdasarkan penghitungan sendiri oleh negara-negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang. Berbagai pertemuan internal dan eksternal dijalankan melalui koalisi ini. Konsolidasi internal ditujukan untuk memperkuat aliansi dengan menyamakan metode dalam memperjuangkan isu SP dan SSM. Hal ini dilakukan dengan mengadakan komunike tingkat menteri dan mengundang pihak di luar koalisi ini seperti Direktur Jenderal WTO, USTR, kominisoner UE dan perwakilan koalisi lain seperti G-20, Cairns dan Afrika. Awalnya, prinsip self designate yang meminta kriteria SP ini diserahkan kepada negara berkembang. Setelah menemukan berbagai pertentangan, koalisi ini kembali melakukan evaluasi terhadap pilihan kebijakannya. Setelah mendengarkan berbagai pandangan, mereka menyepakati bahwa kriteria SP dan SSM bagi produk pertanian, khususnya produk pangan, didasarkan atas food security, rural development dan livelihood security. Strategi negosiasi integratif memberikan peluang adanya perbaikan secara bertahap. Hal ini disebabkan karena strategi ini menempatkan kemungkinan kerja sama, bukan mendorong adanya konflik. Kemungkinan kerja sama itu dapat diciptakan atau didefinisikan ulang melalui negotiation package. Dalam paket negosiasi ini, harus terdapat sesuatu yang membedakan dibandingkan dengan outcome negosiasi sebelumnya yang menjadi dasar. Kemudian, harus terdapat koreasi nilai antara outcome negosiasi sebelumnya dan negotiation package. Hal ini tercermin dalam Paket Bali hasil KTM Ke-9 WTO lalu. Dalam paket negosiasi perundingan yaitu Bali Package, para negosiator menyepakati beberapa hal. Semua kepentingan berusaha diakomodasi melalui hasil negosiasi yang diperbarui. Tidak hanya kepentingan koalisi G-33 saja yang disebutkan dalam hasil paket negosiasi. Kompromi berhasil dicapai melalui peace clause dalam hasil negosiasi public stokeholding. Negara-negara maju yang merasa enggan memberikan fleksibilitas pada akhirnya memberikan tenggat waktu. Paket negosiasi ini tidak sama persis dengan tuntutan negosiasi sebelumnya yaitu mengizinkan subsidi domestik bagi beberapa produk pangan tertentu demi ketahanan pangan, pembangunan pedesaan dan pengentasan kemiskinan tanpa adanya batasan waktu. Posisi Indonesia dalam berbagai koalisi ini ditujukan untuk memenuhi Volume V, Number 2, November

24 kepentingan nasional. Indonesia tidak hanya berkepentingan untuk memastikan sistem liberalisasi komoditas pangan pertanian, tetapi juga memberikan perlindungan bagi petani kecil. Hal ini dilakukan dengan menggunakan strategi negosiasi integratif. Strategi ini menekankan pentingnya win-win solution, membuka ruang dialog yang lebih luas dan tidak bertindak kaku dan manipulatif. Dinamika penggunaan strategi ini terlihat dalam tuntutan dan hasil negosiasi yang dicapai dalam pertemuan antarkoalisi di KTM maupun pertemuan internal di dalam koalisi. Dalam kasus ini, penulis meyakini bahwa posisi Indonesia di dalam tiga koalisi perdagangan yaitu G-20, G-33 dan CAIRNS group digunakan untuk mengakomodasi kepentingan nasionalnya yaitu tidak hanya mendukung AoA melalui liberalisasi komoditas pertanian, tetapi juga mendapatkan perlakuan khusus dan berbeda demi melindungi petani kecil. Hal ini dilakukan melalui strategi negosiasi integratif yang dilakukan Indonesia. Dinamika penggunaan strategi ini terlihat dalam tuntutan dan hasil negosiasi yang dicapai dalam pertemuan antarkoalisi di KTM maupun pertemuan internal di dalam koalisi. Melalui posisinya di koalisi Cairns, Indonesia meminta pertanian sebagai sektor yang harus ditempatkan dalam bahan perundingan WTO. Meskipun tuntutan Cairns untuk membuka akses pasar di negara maju didukung Indonesia, tetapi Indonesia tidak akan memberikan konsesi berupa akses pasar di negaranya tanpa adanya SDT bagi negara berkembang. Kemudian, di dalam koalisi G-20, Indonesia mendukung adanya formula penurunan tarif melalui tiered formula. Indonesia pun berkepentingan untuk meminta penurunan subsidi ekspor di negara maju. Tuntutan Indonesia dalam fleksibilitas khusus juga didukung melalui koalisi ini karena koalisi G-20 menuntut adanya SDT bagi negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang tanpa memberikan SSG bagi negara maju. Melalui koalisi G-33, Indonesia pun tetap pada tujuannya untuk melindungi kepentingan petani kecil melalui konsep SP dan SSM bagi negara berkembang. Meskipun demikian, hasil dari KTM ke-9 WTO masih membutuhkan mencapai permanent solution. Peace clause yang menjadi kesepakatan bersama ini menandakan bahwa solusi masalah ini hanya bersifat sementara. Perundingan pertanian memerlukan perhatian semua pihak, baik negara maju, negara berkembang maupun negara kurang berkembang. Kadar keberhasilan setiap negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang dalam Paket Bali pun berbeda-beda karena memiliki keunggulan produk pertanian yang berbeda-beda. Hal ini pun tentu membutuhkan kajian lebih lanjut terhadap kadar keberhasilan negosiasi pertanian setelah Bali Package. Indonesia harus memainkan peran yang lebih dalam perundingan ini agar mendorong solusi permanen yang lebih adil bagi negara berkembang. DAFTAR PUSTAKA Braun, J.V, et all, Making Agricultural Trade Liberalization Work for The Poor, 2004,halaman 2 Chakar, A. and C.Mukumba, Unpacking The Bali Package, A Snapshot of The Bali Ministerial Decisions of The WTO Members,CUTS, 9 Clapp, J WTO Agriculture Negotiations: Implications for The 22 Journal of World Trade Studies

25 Global South, The Centre of International Governance Innovation, Volume 27, no, 4, halaman 565 Cohen, H You Can Negotiate Anything, edisi bahasa Indonesia Negosiasi, diterjemahkan oleh H.Z.B Tahal, Yogyakarta: PT Pantja Simpati, halaman 18 Cunha, F.C, The WTO Legal Regime for The Actionability of Agricultural Subsidies After The Expiry of Peace Clause,halaman 10 Food and Agriculture Organization, No.16 The Bali Package-Implications for Trade and Food Security, Accessed March 10,2015, w w w. f a o. o r g / d o c r e p / / i3658e/i3658e.pdf Inter Press Service Agency, Public Stokeholding Programmes for Food Security Face Uphill Struggle, Accessed April 10, 2015 ://www. ipsnews.net/2014/07/publicstockholding-programmes-forfood-security-face-uphill-struggle/ Kementerian Luar Negeri, Indonesia Berperan Aktif Dorong Penyelesaian Doha, Accessed April 15,2015, mobile/portaldetail-newslike. aspx?l=id&itemid=e577c63c- 1f6c-4bf3-8e5c-487f , Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. F.A.Q. Accessed March 10, go.id/id/faq Lewiscki, R.J et all. Essentials of Negotiation, 2 nd edn., London: Mc Graw Hill Irwin Messerlin, P.A, G2&G20, Please, Tango!, Instituto Affari Internazionali, halaman 4 World Trade Organization, G- 33 Ministerial Communique, Accessed May 4, 2015, wto.org/official-documents-baliministerial Odell, J.S Negotiation Trade: Developing Countries in The WTO and NAFTA, Cambridge Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Ramphul WTO Agreement on Agriculture and South Asisa s Farm Trade, ICSAC, 18:1 Sally, R Whither The WTO? A Progress Report, CATO Institute 23: 3 Soerjanatamihardja, D.D, et all, 2012, Diplomasi Ekonomi: Optimalisasi Instrumen Kerjasama Luar Negeri Sebagai Upaya Peningkatan Ekspor dan Arus Masuk Investasi Asing ke Indonesia, Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Kementerian Luar Negeri RI The Graduate Institute Geneva, The Bali Agreement: Implications for Development and The WTO, Accessed February 10,2015, poldev.revues.org/1744 Tim Penulis Persetujuan Bidang Pertanian (Agreement on Agriculture/AoA) Seri Terjemahan Tidak Resmi Persetujuan World Trade Organization(WTO), Jakarta: Dirjen Multilateral World Trade Organization, Agriculture: Explanation, Introduction, Accessed March 15, 2015, agric_e/ag_intro01_intro_e.htm, \World Trade Organization. Doha Declaration, Accessed April 15,2015, < Volume V, Number 2, November

26 thewto_e/minist_e?minol_e/ mincecl_e.htm>. World Trade Organizartion. Export Competition, Ministerial Declaration of 7 December Accessed May 4,2015, wto.org/official-documents-baliministerial 24 Journal of World Trade Studies

27 The Implementation of Competition Chapter of the Indonesia- Japan Economic Partnership Agreement Dian Retno Mayang Sari Abstract The IJEPA is the first bilateral agreement that signed by the Indonesian government. Since its enactment in 2007, Indonesia has been eager to enhance the implementation of each sector of the agreement, including competition provision. This article intends to assess whether the implementation of the competition chapter of the IJEPA has met its objectives. As the research data shown on the implementation of the competition chapter of the IJEPA between the KPPU and JFTC leads into many positive cooperation activities. Accordingly, the fulfilment on the objectives of the competition chapter shows that most activities by the KPPU and the JFTC regarding all provisions of the competition chapter such as notification, exchange of information, technical cooperation, and transparency are in line with its objectives. Nevertheless, there were still limitations of its provisions and constraints on its implementation. The provisions of notification did not state in details and specify how to implement, such as (1) timing of notification; (2) in which phase of enforcement activities that notification should be given to the other party; (3) in what way to send the notification letter: (4) also in what kind of relevant area of enforcement activities it is necessary to have notification. Key words: IJEPA, KPPU, competition provision A. INTRODUCTION The EPAs known as the Free Trade Agreements (hereinafter referred to as FTAs) with new issues came about because of the Singapore Issues.1 The issues, which cover trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and 1 Maki Aoki, New issues in FTAs: The case of Economic Partnership Agreements between Japan and ASEAN Countries, IDE APEC Study center, Working Paper Series 03/04-No.8 (2004): 2, go.jp/english/publish/download/apec/ pdf/2003_08.pdf. trade facilitation, brought by developed countries, such as Japan and the EU, into WTO agenda. Unfortunately, during the Doha Round, these issues dramatically resulted in a damaging impasse. Towards this disappointed situations, many developed countries created their own bilateral agreement. Embarked as the new era of the FTAs, the EPAs were established as the comprehensive form of trade bilateral agreement cover not only reduction or liberalization of trade in goods and services but also cover wider aspects such as promoting of investment, expanding of human exchanges, making rule in government procurement (rules of origin and Volume V, Number 2, November

28 customs procedures), energy and mineral resources, competition, intellectual property rights and improvement of business activities. 2 This was also as one of strategies to provide alternative-solution towards the un-resolved Singapore Issues. Therefore, since 2002, Japan also has been eagerly establishing EPAs with many countries, including Indonesia. For Indonesia, the IJEPA was its first bilateral agreement and was expected to promote mutually beneficial economic ties between the two countries. Since its enactment in 2007, Indonesia has been eager to enhance the implementation of each sector of the agreement. One of these areas is competition. The necessity of competition in this agreement was to manage and promote the fair trade in business activities with the objective of promoting and facilitating the enforcement of competition law and/or policy between two countries effectively and efficiently. 3 The competition chapter contains nine provisions that should be imple mented by the authorized party of each country. As for Japan is the Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as JFTC) with its competition law, No. 54 of 1947, concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade (hereinafter referred to as AMA) Law. 4 The authorized party 4 Implementing Agreement Between The Govfor Indonesia is the Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (hereinafter referred to as KPPU) with its competition law, No. 5 of 1999, concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (hereinafter referred to as the Law No. 5). 5 Both parties should implement nine provisions, which are notification, information exchange, coordination of enforcement activities, technical cooperation, transparency, consultations, reviews, and confidentiality of information and communication in order to address the anti-competitive activities. 6 Although, marked as Indonesia s first bilateral-economic-agreement, after its ratification in 2007, there have been few, even none, records of reviews or analyses of the implementation of the competition chapter of the IJEPA. Thus, this research conducted with main objective in order to determine whether the implementation of the competition chapter of the IJEPA has met its objectives. The other objective of this research is to proposing recommendations for improvement and future changes in order to strengthen the cooperation between two and fully meet its objectives and expectations. B. RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTING METHOD 2 Yorizumi Watanabe, Japan s FTA/EPA Policy and Perspectives for East Asian Economic Community, European Institute for Asian Studies, accessed June 18, 2012, org/luncheons/2006/japantrade050406/watanabe.pdf. 3 JFTC, Outline Slide. ernment of Japan and The Government of The Republic of Indonesia Pursuant to Article 13 of The Agreement Between Japan and The Republic of Indonesia for an Economic Partnership, JFTC, accessed December 5, 2012, go.jp/en/international_relations/agreements/ index.html. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 26 Journal of World Trade Studies

29 The methodology of this research is using qualitative data with descriptive analysis and case study approach. The primary data was collected through interviews with both the JFTC and KPPU officials and their official documents. The nine provisions of the competition chapter of the IJEPA consists of: (1) Notification; (2) Exchange of Information; (3) Coordination of Enforcement Activities; (4) Technical Cooperation; (5) Transparency; (6) Consultations; (7) Review; (8) Confidentiality of Information; and (9) Communication are the variables to determine whether its implementation has met its objectives and main expectation. The research was conducted in year of 2012, after five years from the IJEPA first ratification on August 2007 and the fieldwork was in Tokyo, Japan and Jakarta, Indonesia. C. LITERATURE REVIEW One of the reasons on competition to be included in the EPA is when the WTO encountered controversial Singapore issues and avoided to take real endeavour to resolve those issues, but the phenomenal conditions on the market globalization because of the free trade or liberalization is also worth to be state. Confirming the market globalization has effects on competition, Maher M. Dabbah expressed his statement that: Globalization has led to an increase in the number of competition law issues that t r a n scend national boundaries. The sequence in this regard is an easy one to follow. As markets and competition become increasingly international, so do anticompetitive situations. It can be seen therefore that globalization has very significant implication for competition law in the global economy. Globalization has made it almost inevitable to change competition law and policy. In this regard, the internationalization of competition law can be seen as a response to market globalization. Indeed, globalization has had a direct impact in the field of competition 7 Another important reason is as a substitute for harmonization of competition laws.. Supporting this reason, Anestis S. Papadopoulos explains: In the field of competition law enforcement cooperation has been used as an alternative for the harmonization of national competition law. Since no agreement on multilateral code on restrictive business practices could achieve in the last century, a number countries with active international trade and a developed competition law cooperated on enforcement of their competition laws in order to confront the consequences of the increasing number of restrictive business practices with an international effect. 8 Furthermore, Papadopoulos also mentioned the initial case of the competition enforcement cooperation which happened in late 1950s, where as a conflict arose between the governments of Canada and the United States in a case 7 Maher M. Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law, (New York: Cambridge, 2010), Anestis S. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, (New York: Cambridge, 2010), 52. Volume V, Number 2, November

30 relating to an US investigation of patent pool among Canadian radio and television makers designed to exclude US manufactured products from the Canadian market, the governments of the United States and Canadian entered into negotiations in order to coordinate their enforcement activities and avoid similar conflicts. 9 The outcome of this case and the subsequent negotiations was the Fulton-Rodgers understanding of 1959, 10 in which the two governments agreed to construct a channel of the communication regarding antitrust matters, through notification and consultation. 11 Accordingly, Papadopoulos stated competition is included in bilateral agreement because its main role for competition law is to reduce and, if possible, to eliminate, practices carried out by private undertakings that may have an effect on trade and the function of competition as a tool to secure and strengthen market integration. 12 In addition to the potentially fairfree trade-competition, Louis Michel expressed those countries with no competition rules pay more their imports and 9 Ibid. 10 K. von Finckenstein, International Antitrust Cooperation: Bilateralism or Multilateralism, (speech delivered in Vancouver, 31 May 2001, quoted in Anestis S. Papadopoulos, International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (New York: Cambridge, 2010), C. Stark, Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation, (speech delivered in Washington DC, 23 June 2000), quoted in Anestis S. Papadopoulos, International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (New York: Cambridge, 2010), Papadopoulos, The International Dimension, for goods and services produces locally. 13 Thus, the cost of an effective competition policy is therefore negligible when set against the gains it would bring 14. Michel also describes the necessity for compe tition to be included in EPAs based on the example of cartel cases in the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries which cost hundreds of millions of dollars. In 1997, it is reckoned that the price-cartel-agreement between suppliers covered almost 9% of the poorest countries imports and in 1999 cartels in heavy engineering sector overcharged Kenya and Zimbabwe by 270 million dollars. 15 D. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION CHAPTER OF THE IJEPA 1. The Progress of the Implementation of the Competition Chapter of the IJEPA Based on the provisions in Chapter 5 (competition) of the Implementing Agreement, there are at least nine articles which should be implemented by the KPPU and JFTC, as follows: 1. Article 12 of Notification 2. Article 13 of Exchange of Information 3. Article 14 of Coordination of Enforcement Activities 13 Lois Michel, Economic Partnership Agreement: Drivers of Development, (Saarbrucken: Dictus Publishing, 2010), Ibid., Lois Michel, Economic Partnership Agreement: Drivers of Development, (Saarbrucken: Dictus Publishing, 2010), Journal of World Trade Studies

31 4. Article 15 of Cooperation 5. Article 16 of Transparency 6. Article 17 of Consultations 7. Article 18 of Review 8. Article 19 of Confidentiality of Information 9. Article 20 of Communication. Implementation of Article 12 of Notification At the early stage of its implemen tation in October 2009, 16 the JFTC sent a notification letter to the KPPU KPP concerning the enforcement activities by the concern- JFTC which involved violations by two Indonesian entrepreneurs against the Japan s AMA. It was the cartel case of Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs) for television (See Table 3.2 below) which was also known as the first international price cartel investigated by the JFTC. In this case, the eleven entrepreneurs, listed in Table 1, formed an agreement to continuously hold meetings about once every month where they jointly set minimum target prices which each of them should abide by and should be applied to the selling prices for Japanese manufacturing and sales companies of CRT televisions on an approximately quarterly basis. Their activities substantially restrained competition in the field of sales of CRTs. Thus, the JFTC found they had engaged in activities that violated Article 3 (prohibition of unreasonable restraint of trade) of the AMA and issued a cease and desist order and surcharge payment orders. In addition, the Natural Gas Project of Donggi-Senoro case on January 2011 Table 1. The Name of Entrepreneurs Involved in Violation in CRT Case and JFTC s Decisions on Cease and Desist also Surcharge Payment No Entrepreneurs Location Cease and Desist Order 1 MT Picture Display Co., Ltd. Japan x - 2 MT Picture Display (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd Surcharge Payment Order (in Yen) Malaysia - 650,830,000 3 PT. MT Picture Display Indonesia Indonesia - 580,270,000 4 MT Picture Display (Thailand) Co., Ltd Thailand - 566,140,000 5 Samsung SDI Co., Ltd Korea x - 6 Samsung SDI (Malaysia) BERHAD Malaysia - 1,373,620,000 7 LG Philips Displays Korea Co., Ltd Korea - 151,380,000 8 PT. LP Displays Indonesia Indonesia - 932,680,000 9 Chunghwa Picture Tubes Co., Ltd China JFTC, Outline Slide. Volume V, Number 2, November

32 No Entrepreneurs Location 10 Chunghwa Picture Tubes (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd Cease and Desist Order Surcharge Payment Order (in Yen) Malaysia Thai CRT Co., Ltd Thailand - - Total 2 Companies 4,254,920,000 Source: The JFTC s outline slide on CRT Case, June 28, 2012 is one of the bid-rigging cases conducted by the KPPU in which Japanese entrepreneur involved in violation. 17 In this case the KPPU issued a decision on the violation of Article and Article of the Law No. 5 against four entrepreneurs, 20 one of them was Mitsubishi Co. (Japanese entrepreneur), upon their conspiracy on the bid-rigging process for liquid natural gas (LNG) project of Donggi-Senoro in Central Sulawesi. During its process, the KPPU found that Mitsubishi Co. colluded with PT. Pertamina, PT. Medco Energi International to set Mitsubishi Co. to win the bid, which violated Article 22. Furthermore, according to Article 23, the KPPU 17 Decision on the Violation of Indonesian Competition Law in the Beauty Contest Process for Liquid Natural Gas Project (Decision No. 35/KPPU-I/2010), KPPU, accessed October 28, 2012, putusan_35_2010_donggi%20senoro.pdf. 18 Business actors shall be prohibited from entering into conspiracies with other parties in order to determine awardees of tenders which may result in unfair business competition. 19 Business actors shall be prohibited from conspiring with other parties to obtain information regarding the business activities of their competitors classified as company secrets which may result in unfair business competition. 20 PT. Pertamina, PT. Medco Energi Internasional, PT. Medco E&P Tomori Sulawesi, and Mitsubishi Co. found that Mitsubishi Co. colluded with PT. Pertamina, PT. Medco Energi International, and PT. Medco E&P Tomori International to obtain business information about PT. LNG International, a competitor of Mitsubishi Co. s. The information was classified as a company secret by a confidentiality agreement. The said information was obtained through due diligence processed by PT. Pertamina on early document submissions from PT. LNG International for the Senoro Project (a project where Mitsubishi Co and PT. LNG International had intention to submit their joint cooperation). The joint cooperation was un-concluded, and the obtained information was then benefited by Mitsubishi Co. by using it as the background information in preparing project proposal for the Donggi-Senoro Project. Under this case, the KPPU decided that Mitsubishi Co. must pay fines according to its violation acts, as described on Table 2 below. In regard to implementing Article 12 of notification of the competition chapter and its enforcement activities, the KPPU sent the notification letter to the JFTC concerning the violation of Mitsubishi Co. as one of Japanese entrepreneur, against the Law no Furthermore, another bid rigging 21 1 IDR = JPY. 30 Journal of World Trade Studies

33 Table 2. The Entrepreneurs Involved in Violation of Donggi-Senoro Case and the KPPU s Decision on Fines Entrepreneurs Fines (in Rp) Fines (in Yen) 21 PT. Pertamina 10,000,000,000 91,851,898 PT. Medco EnergiInternasional 5,000,000,000 45,926,152 PT. Medco E&P Tomori Sulawesi 1,000,000,000 9,185,230 Mitsubishi Co. 15,000,000, ,768,184 Total 31,000,000, ,729,008 Source: KPPU s Decision on the Donggi-Senoro case, January 2011 case of consulting services for Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) System Project 22 also involving one of the Japanese entrepreneurs, namely Nippon Koei Ltd. In this case, Nippon Koei Ltd. was suspected of entering into collusion and conspiracy with the Directorate General of Railways of the Ministry of Transportation, as the committee of the bid, to win the bid. Nevertheless, the investigation conducted by the KPPU stopped and dismissed on the level of clarification because Nippon Koei Ltd. was not found to conduct conspiracy and collusion activities which may lead to unfair business competition. For enforcement of this case, the KPPU only issued a letter of recommendation and consideration, no. 874/K/XI/2009, concerning Tender of consulting services for Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit (MRT). In regard on implementing the notification provision of the competition chapter, informally, the KPPU sent notification letter on this case to the investigation bureau of the JFTC by . Those three notification cases describean early realization on implementing the notification provisions of de- the competition chapter of the IJEPA. Implementation of Article 13 of Exchange of Information In order to implement this provision, the type of information to be shared is public information, and if related to the cases that are investigated by the KPPU or JFTC, the description of the information may include the name of company and its alleged activities, but the cases should be registered as preliminary examination or after the decision of each commission. 23 Outside of the cases, exchange of information by both commissions may be related to competition policy such as competition regulations, market study, market development and so forth Deswin Nur, Moh. Reza, Esti Wulandari, Ulfah Purba and Ina Purwati, interview by the author, KPPU Headquarter, August 7- August 10, KPPU, Chapter III: The Follow Up Follow-Up the Implementation Agreement of IJEPA on Competition (Indonesian Version), December 19, Deswin Nur, interview by the author, KPPU Headquarter, August 7, Volume V, Number 2, November

34 Furthermore, in regard to exchange information, either the KPPU or JFTC will give the information needed by each other in order to assist its enforcement. Nevertheless, requesting or exchanging information done by both commissions is usually by The KPPU will send or request information directly to the Investigation Division of the JFTC and/ or deliver it to the International Affairs Division. The same as the KPPU, the JFTC will also send or request the information directly to the foreign division of the KPPU. Heretofore, there were not any official letters delivered by both commissions. Implementation of Article 14 of Coordination of Enforcement Activities With regard to coordination of enforcement activities, the context of this article was unclear. It was not specifically described how the KPPU and JFTC coordinate with each other to take action in related matters and when it needs consideration to develop their coordination. 26 WTO s Working Group on the Interaction betraining course, seminars, and dispatch competition policy experts or Resident Advisor. 27 It was realized in the project, namely Competition Policy Project Phase (II), with its goal to improve the effectiveness of enforcement of competition policy and to promote the fair competition in the market of Indonesia, 28 Which provided by the JFTC in cooperation with Japan International Cooperation Agency (hereinafter referred to as JICA). Dispatch Competition Policy Experts or Resident Advisor In regard to competition policy assistance, The JFTC has dispatched competition policy experts to the KPPU as a long-term resident advisor for in-depth technical assistance on the field of competition law and policy development. 29 The expert assigned in the KPPU office in purpose to assist the KPPU on its endeavour to enforce competition law and policy in a more strategic and effective way, with certain responsibility, such as: 30 Implementation of Article 15 of Technical Cooperation: The Highest Achievement on Technical Assistance Offered and Contributed by the JFTC Technical assistance offered and contributed by the JFTC is focused on human resources or capacity building and institutional development. Its purpose on promoting competition law and policy based on the respect for each recipient country s individual needs, 26 such as 25 Ibid. tween Trade and Competition Policy, Communication from Japan: The Experiences of Japan and APEC in Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, WT/WGTCP/W186 (June 19, 2002): 2, pdf. 27 Technical assistance offered and contributed by the Japan Fair Trade Commission, JFTC (2004): 1, accessed December 3, 2012, KPPU, Project Design Matrix: Project for Competition Policy (Phase II) Annex 1, (2009): Technical assistance offered and contributed by the Japan Fair Trade Commission, JFTC. 30 KPPU, Outputs and Activities in Record of Discussions (RD), Journal of World Trade Studies

35 1. To give advice in order to promote the implementation of activities of the project. 2. To enhance the function of investigation of the KPPU. 3. To promote and disseminate the knowledge regarding the competition policy among governments, enterprises, consumers, academics, and judges. Capacity Building In terms of Competition Policy Project Phase II, the JFTC in cooperation with the JICA has provided capacity building development of the KPPU through some training. Its main goal is to develop the human resources of the KPPU to implement competition law. For Detailed its realizations are shown on the table 3 below. E. COMPETITION POLICY ASSISTANCE ON EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT The technical assistance also provides the necessary equipment for the KPPU in order to support the daily activities of competition law and policy enforcement. On April 21, 2012, the KPPU received equipment assistance installed in the KPPU main office in Jakarta, as describe on the following table: Implementation of 16 of Transparency In regard to implementation of transparency, KPPU s transparency activities covered information on its guidelines or regulations, such as regulation on merger and acquisitions, guideline on case handling procedure, regulation on conspiracy on bid rigging, and so Table 3. Implementation of Technical Assistance by JFTC Type I. Short Term Training a. Advanced Level Training (Country focused training) Number of times Output Venue 3 times 30 staffs Japan b. General Training (1 month) 1 times 1 staffs Japan c. Internship 1 times 1 staffs Japan d. In country Training (Seminar/ Workshop and Training) e. Daily Training (provided by Resident Advisor) II. Long term training (graduate scholarship) 12 times KPPU staffs and other Indonesian stakeholders Every month = 10 times Internal KPPU (all staffs in central office of KPPU) Indonesia Indonesia 3 times 3 staffs Japan Source: Compilation data from the KPPU and JFTC, Volume V, Number 2, November

36 Table 4. The Equipment List on the Competition Policy Project No. Name of Item Marker/Model Quantity Total price 1 Desktop Computer Lenovo Think Center M58 28 set $ 27,580 2 Printer Canon Pixama ip pcs $ 6,720 3 Projector Epson EB pcs $ 8,100 Total $ 42,400 Source: KPPU s document on provision of equipment, April 21, 2012 on. In similar to the KPPU, the JFTC also conducted transparency activities by informing the KPPU of the JFTC s guidelines and amendment of Japan s AMA. Furthermore, JFTC continually informs the KPPU of its development and enforcement activities. Implementation of Article 17 of Consultations This consultations procedure is proposed to replace the dispute settlement mechanism of Chapter 14 of the IJEPA 31 in order to resolve the disputes which arise while implementing the competition chapter. According to an interview of the JFTC, the disputes will not be resolved through disputes settlement mechanism, as stated in Chapter 14 of the IJEPA, 32 but instead should be resolved through consultations between 31 Paragraph 1 Article 138 (Scope) says: 1. This Chapter shall apply with respect to the settlement of disputes between the Parties arising out of the interpretation and/or application of this Agreement. 32 Paragraph 2, Article 138 (Scope) says: 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, this Chapter except Article 139 shall not apply to Articles 104 and 122, and Chapters 10 through 13, and Chapter 11 of IJEPA is Competition, thus, the dispute settlement will not apply to competition chapter. two agencies (the KPPU and JFTC). This aims for cooperative problem solving process. In regard to the implementation of this article, there has not been any conflict arising between the KPPU and JFTC while implementing this chapter. Thus, a consultation to resolve the disputes has never been held before. Implementation of Article 18 of Review Since its ratification, it has not had any discussion on the review of Article 18. Therefore, reviewing on this chapter was never held before. Yet, it should be realized like other chapters in trade and liberalization. Implementation of Article 19 of Confidentiality of Information Exchange of confidential information is one of the most sensitive issues relating to enforcement cooperation in the field of competition law. According to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 19 of confidentiality of information, both KPPU and confi- JFTC may limit the information it provides to the other Party when the other Party is unable to give the assurance with respect to the maintenance of confidentiality or the limitations of purposes 34 Journal of World Trade Studies

37 for which the information will be used, except the publicly available information. Yet, if the confidential information is needed for presentation in criminal proceedings carried out by a court or a judge of either Japan or Indonesia, then each country shall submit a request for such information through diplomatic channel or other channels established in accordance with the laws and regulations. In regard to the implementation of confidentiality information, there were some information and data requested by KPPU, but could not be provided by JFTC because such requests concern on confidential information and those information were not requested for criminal proceedings process. 33 Implementation of Article 20 of Communication According to Article 20, communication related to the any field of competition law and policy can be conducted directly between the KPPU and JFTC. Occasionally, under certain circumstances the communications will be conducted through diplomatic channels, but to accelerate the communication between two parties, the technical procedure of its implementation will be discussed and agreed by both the KPPU and JFTC. 34 Figure 1 below shows the KPPU s organizational structure with its disposition flow which is involved in implementing the competition chapter. In addition, Figure 2 shows the JFTC 33 Deswin Nur, interview by the author, KPPU Headquarter, August 6, KPPU, Chapter III: The Follow-Up. organization structure and their disposition flow which are involved in implementing the competition chapter. Evaluation Review on the Implementation of the Competition Chapter of the IJEPA The implementation of the competition chapter of the IJEPA will be considereasuccessful if those provisions implemented by the JFTC and KPPU meet its main expectations and objectives. F. ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION CHAPTER OF THE IJEPA: FULFILLING THE OBJECTIVES AND ITS LIMITATION Fulfilling the Objectives of Competition Chapter of the IJEPA As the research data shown on the implementation of the competition chapter of the IJEPA between the KPPU and JFTC leads into many positive cooperation activities. Accordingly, the fulfilment on the objectives of the competition chapter shows that most activities by the KPPU and the JFTC regarding all provisions of the competition chapter such as notification, exchange of information, technical cooperation, and transparency are in line with its objectives. Figure 4 below simply shows the fulfilment of objectives of the competition chapter. Limitations of the Competition Chapter and Constraints in Its Implementation Although, almost all the provisions of the competition chapter fulfil its main expectation and objectives, there Volume V, Number 2, November

38 Figure 1. The KPPU s Organization Structure and Disposition Flow on the Implementation of the Competition Chapter Source: Author, 2012 are some findings on the limitations in regard with provisions of the competition chapter, which may be lead to constraints of implementation activities conducted by the KPPU and JFTC in order to strengthen and enhance effective competition cooperation under the framework of the IJEPA. Those are discussed below. 1. Notification There are not sufficiently detailed explanations regarding technical implementation of notification, such as: a. Timing of Notification According to an interview with the KPPU, timing when the notification letter should be delivered or deciding the time requirement to issue a notification letter to the other party is still ambiguous and vague. These ambiguities and vagueness may become one of constraints for both the KPPU and JFTC in implementation of 36 Journal of World Trade Studies

39 Figure 2. The JFTC s Organization Structure and Disposition flow on the Implementation of the Competition Chapter Source:The JFTC s outline slide on organization chart of the JFTC, June 28, 2012 the notification provision of the competition chapter. Refer to Rill explanation that the notification set forth not only obligation for each party to notify the other party of competition activities affecting the interest of other party, but also described in detail the circumstances and timing when notification should take place. 35 Furthermore, Rill states that the detailed timing provisions are designed to facilitate timely interface between the agencies. b. The phase of enforcement activities 35 James F. Rill, The U.S./EC Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Genesis, Innovation, and Early Implementation, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, no. 1 (2011): 3, when notification should be given to other party Regarding the notification provision in the competition chapter of the IJEPA, it only states that each party should notify the competition authority of the other party of certain enforcement activities which may affect the important interests of the other party. Notwithstanding, limitation appears here because it does not clearly state in which phase of enforcement activities notification should be given. Compare to the Competition Chapter of Japan-Switzerland EPA that clearly stated on the Paragraph 4 (a), Where notification is required pursuant to paragraph 1 with respect to enforcement activi Volume V, Number 2, November

40 Figure 3. The Connectivity of the Implementation of the Competition Chapter with its Objectives and Main Expectation and the Evaluation Review of its Implementation Source: Author compilation, 2012 Article 10 of Notification of the Competition Chapter of Japan-Switzerland EPA, the JFTC s possible actions on notification that should be given to the competition authority of Switzerland, are explained as follows: 37 ties other than those related to mergers or acquisitions, the notification shall be given and Paragraph 1 says The competition authority of each Party shall notify the competition authority of the other Party of the enforcement activities of its Party that it considers may affect the important interests of the Country of the other Party. 37 Implementing Agreement Between The Government of Japan and The Swiss Federal Council (i) the filing of a criminal accusation; (ii) the filing of a complaint seeking an urgent injunction (iii) the issuance of the decision to initiate a hearing (iv) the issuance of a cease and desist order; and (v) the issuance of a surcharge payment order when no prior or simultane Pursuant to Article 10 of The Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Partnership Between Japan and The Swiss Confederation, JFTC, accessed December 8, 2009, 38 Journal of World Trade Studies

41 Figure 4. Fulfilling of the Objectives of the Competition Chapter Source: Author, 2012 ous cease and desist order with respect to the payer has been issued; Accordingly, the unclear and undetailed requirement actions in the notification provision of the competition chapter of the IJEPA may become one of the constraints for both the KPPU and JFTC in its implementation. c. The description on which way the notification letter should be delivered In the actions of delivering notification letter, the JFTC sent the notification letter through diplomatic way, Indonesian embassy. On the other hand, the KPPU sent it directly to the Investigation Division of the JFTC. This dissimilarity between the KPPU and JFTC due to unspecified technical procedures can also become one of the constraints to the implementation of this provision. d. Relevant interested areas of enforcement activities that are necessary to have notification. Admittedly, the notification provision states that each party shall give notification regarding its enforcement activities that it considers may affect the important interests of the other party. However, it is still a vague statement. Thus, one must question is in which area Volume V, Number 2, November

42 Table 5. KPPU s Merger Cases on the Merger Notification and Merger Consultation Merger Notification 3 (three) cases: 1. On March 2 nd, Mitsubishi Co. merger with Tomori E&P Limited 2. Toshiba Corporation merger with PT Envitech Perkasa on May 19, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co. Ltd merger with PT Asuransi Jiwa Sinarmas on July 20, Merger Consultation 1 (one) case: On September 13, 2011, Komatsu Undercarriage made consultation with KPPU on its proposed acquisition of PT Komatsu Forging Indonesia. Source: Lili Rosmiati, interview by the author, KPPU Headquarter, August 10, 2012 and compilation data on the notification list of merger and acquisition, accessed October 28, 2012, of important interest each party should notify about. In fieldwork, the author found that there were four of KPPU merger cases consisting of three cases of merger notifications and one case of merger consultation which has not been notified to the JFTC, 38 all of which will be shown in Table 5. Thus, the notification provision of the competition chapter of the IJEPA, which does not describe details of relevant areas like mergers and acquisitions, become limitation on both endeavour activities of notification implementation. Detailed descriptions on the notification activities, may lead to the successful implementation. They also become necessary since notification is one of important provisions of the competition chapter of the IJEPA, besides exchange information and technical assistance, to be implemented by both the KPPU and JFTC Coordination of Enforcement Activities In provision of coordination of enforcement activities, the context of coordination activities was not described in details. One question arises concerning this provision implementation: in which enforcement activities both the KPPU and JFTC should coordinate? The unclear description under the coordination of enforcement activities also may lead to the constraints of the competition chapter implementation. 3. Consultations The provision of consultations also 38 Lili Rosmiati, interview by the author, KPPU Headquarter, August 10, See Section 2.4. Provisions of Competition Chapter of the IJEPA, p. 17 of this paper. 40 Journal of World Trade Studies

43 vaguely talks about how framework in consultation actions should be implemented by the KPPU and the JFTC. This provision should include the description of several real-actions, if there are incompatible functions of the competition chapter. It may be necessary to provide a detailed description since the competition chapter was purposed to replace dispute settlement by consultation. Thus, this provision also has its limitation and may lead to constraint of the competition chapter implementation. 4. Review The provision of review also has limitations. This provision only describes that in review, the Parties may consider enhancing the cooperation pursuant to this Chapter such as notification, exchange of information, coordination of enforcement activities and technical cooperation, 40 but it not specifically states neither the time to hold review nor the mechanism to review those provisions. Thus, both the KPPU and the JFTC have not performed a review on the implementation activities of the competition chapter of IJEPA. G. POLICY RECOMMENDATION: THE SHORT-TERM REFORM AND LONG-TERM REFORM The Short-Term Reform: Technical Guideline for Implementing the Competition Chapter of the IJEPA The technical guideline is recommended as the first step of actions for both the KPPU and the JFTC for future changes in order to meet the objectives 40 Paragraph 2, Article 18 (Review). of the competition chapter. This guideline may also work as a realistic approach to corroborate implementation activities from ambiguity and work as a way to resolve some limitations of provisions of the competition chapter and the constraints of its implementation. However, in order to realize it and make such technical guideline, further discussion and review by both the KPPU and the JFTC is necessary. The following descriptions suggest possible content of the technical guidelines for implementing the competition chapter. 1. Review: Continually conduct review It is necessary to describe the de tailed activities in the technical guideline, for example, to hold review once in five years including the description of the mechanism activities on how to review all provisions of the competition chapter of the IJEPA. Nevertheless, this review should be based on the consensus of both parties and it is necessary to further discussion. 2. Coordination of Enforcement Activities: Set Regular Meeting In regard to the coordination of enforcement activities; technical guidelines should describe the coordination related to both the KPPU and JFTC s mutual interests. In order to coordinate, it may be necessary to set a regular meeting or annual meeting of both parties, for example meeting twice a year to discuss future frameworks of coordination in order to establish comprehensive cooperation on competition enforcement activities. Also, within this meeting both parties can share experiences and consult each other on specific issues related to competition law and policy. 3. Consultations: Establish Joint Committee Volume V, Number 2, November

44 As the replacement of dispute settlements, detailed activities with regard to consultation also become a consideration to be included on the technical guideline to eliminate the vagueness of its activities. This is because consultations should be the action taken if there are incompatibles actions conducted by both the KPPU and the JFTC with the objectives of this chapter. Furthermore, for realizing consultation actions it will be necessary to establish the Joint Committee as the media to request consultations. This committee will assign a representative to resolve disputes between the KPPU and the JFTC that arise when implementing the competition chapter of IJEPA. 4. Notification The contents of the technical guideline on notification may refer to Subsection , which includes description on the specific implementation activities such as: a. Timing of notification; it may specifically state the due date to send the notification letter, for example, no later than two weeks after the commissioners final decision b. The content of the notification letter; within the notification letter each party should give detailed descriptions of enforcement activities such as date and time, businesses who were involved, which article is imposed, the decision and details of the scene of enforcement and so forth. c. Relevant interested areas of enforcement activities that are necessary to have notification; one of the limitations on the notification provision of IJEPA compared to others competition chapters is the detailed relevant area on the mergers and acquisitions. This is should be taken into consideration because the mergers and acquisitions may affect the important interests of each party. Thus, it will be necessary to have descriptions of the technical guideline including the notification actions on mergers and acquisitions. d. The phase of enforcement activities when notification should be given to other party; it is also necessary to include in the guideline detailed description on which stage of enforcement activities notification should be informed to other party. For example, one party should have to notify to other party in one of these phases; clarification, the preliminary examination, the advanced examination or after the final decision; and continually send notification if enforcement activities enter into the next phase. e. The description on in what kind of way the notification letter should be delivered also should also be included in technical guideline. It is described above that there was dissimilarity between the KPPU and JFTC in the way they sent the notification letter; the JFTC sent it through diplomatic channel while the KPPU sent the notification directly to the JFTC. Thus, in the guideline, it should clearly discuss this procedure. Nevertheless, this suggestion should be discussed first by both parties, 42 Journal of World Trade Studies

45 under what circumstances and activities they can conduct informal notification as initial step with respect of each other s confidentiality information. As recommendation for improvement and future changes, the content of technical guideline not only limit for provisions stated above but also for other provisions such as exchange of information, transparency, technical cooperation, confidentiality of information and communications. In such overarching descriptions, the technical guideline may enhance and strengthen the competition authority s position, especially the KPPU, in other bilateral agreements concerning on competition. Furthermore, the goal of this recommendation is to provide a comprehensive guideline, not only applicable for the IJEPA competition chapter but also other EPAs. The Long-Term Reform: Amendment Proposed to long-term reform, possible area to review for future amendment of the competition chapter of IJEPA is comity. This is because the competition chapter of the IJEPA has not included the negative and positive comity. Refer to Papadopoulos, negative comity is primarily aimed at the avoidance of conflicts between cooperating parties. 41 It is a concept under which extraterritorial jurisdiction are often grounded in consideration of polite 41 Papadopoulos, The International Dimension, 64. ness 42 or good will between sovereigns 43 and a willingness to grant a privilege, not as matter of right, but out of deference and good will 44 in order to avoid the conflicts relating to jurisdiction. In regard to the positive comity, it could be characterised as the most revolutionary form for cooperation 45 because one party to an agreement can request the other party to take enforcement action. Accordingly, the characteristic provision approach on positive and negative comity will be worth taking into consideration and necessary to review for future recommendation. That is because both positive and negative comity may meet the objectives of the competition chapter, which is described in Figure Black s Law Dictionary 267 (6th ed. 1990). The U.S. Supreme Court has defined comity as the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, and Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895), quoted in J.R. Paul, Comity in International Law, Harvard International Law Journal 2, 32, no.1 (1991): Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law 79 (R. Dana 8th ed. 1866) and Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 34 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955), quoted in A.J. Himelfarb, The International Language of Convergence: Reviving the Antitrust Dialogue between the United States of America and the European Union with a Uniform Understanding of Extraterritoriality, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 17, no. 3 (1996): William E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law 14 n. 1 (A.P. Higgings 7 th ed. 1917) Law Dictionary 267 (6th ed. 1990) and Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 34 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955), quoted in Himelfarb, The International Language, Papadopoulos, The International Dimension, 73. Volume V, Number 2, November

46 Figure 5. The Connectivity of Negative and Positive Comity to the Objectives of the Competition Chapter of the IJEPA Source: Author, Possible Strategies: Internal KPPU Measures to Improve the Implementation of the Competition Chapter of the IJEPA (Unilateral Measures) Under the circumstances of KPPU actions on implementing the competition chapter, there may be possible strategies to be taken into consideration on internal KPPU measures in order to improve its implementation, which describe as follows: 1. Propose to enhance coordination between the Foreign Cooperation Division with other related bureaus and divisions, which are involved in implementing of the competition chapter, such as the Bureau of Legal Action, Bureau of Investigation and related bureau including their divisions Re-disseminating the competition chapter of the IJEPA to the related bureaus and divisions in order to remind them of their task in realizing its implementation. This activity will be responsibility of, and carried out by Foreign Cooperation Divisions. It is because, in the KPPU, all activities related to the foreign relations activities are centralized in Foreign Cooperation Divisions. Furthermore, in order to effectively re-disseminate this information, the KPPU may hold internal seminar or workshop. H. CONCLUSION After analysing the implementation of the competition chapter of the 46 For further information, see figure 3.2 the KPPU s organization structure and disposition flow on implementation of competition chapter. 44 Journal of World Trade Studies

47 IJEPA conducted by the JFTC and KPPU, it showed the positive outcomes. Under the framework competition chapter of IJEPA, the relation and cooperation between the JFTC and KPPU became more comprehensive. Many provisions of competition chapter were realized consistent with its objectives and main expectation. Notification, sharing and ex- exchange information related to the issues of each institution become more effective and transparent. Requesting inputs or opinions of fair business competition regulations or issues related to business competition from Japan or the vice versa become easier and efficient. Technical cooperation also realized in order to promote and facilitate the strengthening of KPPU enforcement activities. Nevertheless, there were still limitations of its provisions and constraints on its implementation. The provisions of notification did not state in details and specify how to implement, such as (1) timing of notification; (2) in which phase of enforcement activities that notification should be given to the other party; (3) in what way to send the notification letter: (4) also in what kind of relevant area of enforcement activities it is neces sary to have notification. Furthermore, other provisions such as coordination of enforcement activities, consultations and review do not describe in details what kind of specific actions are needed. Those provisions bring the vagueness and ambiguity on their implementation activities, which lead to the limitations on those provisions and constraints on their implementation. In order to address and resolve those vagueness, limitations and constraints, this research proposing two possible policy recommendations for improvement and future changes on the implementation activities. First, possible policy recommendation is to set a forum for discussion on the constraints and future changes. This recommendation offers the short-term and long-term reform. Proposing the technical guideline will be the first possible action to take and more realistic approach toward the short-term reform recommendation. The guideline will contain detailed descriptions on technical implementation activities of each provision. Another recommendation is an amendment of the competition chapter to introduce provisions on comity. It is possible to take into consideration because the characteristics provisions on positive and negative comity meet the objectives of the competition chapter of the IJEPA. In addition, in order to realize such recommendations, there should be consensus between two parties, and especially for amendment, it will take long time to create consensus. Second, recommendation for KP PU s internal measures, such as enhancing coordination between the Foreign Cooperation Division with other related bureaus and divisions and re-disseminating the competition chapter of the IJEPA to the related bureaus and divisions in order to remind them of their task in realizing its implementation. This recommendation can be unilaterally implemented without any consensus. Those recommendations might not be easy to make them realize immediately. Even though for the short-term reform recommendation, it still needs to take step to open for its- first-consensus between the KPPU and JFTC. Yet, it is necessary to keep in mind that those recommendations are ambitious solutions for improvement and futures changes. If they can be translated into real-policy actions, it will bring the im Volume V, Number 2, November

48 provement to the stage of much more advanced cooperation on the competition chapter, not only under the IJEPA but also other EPAs. On top of that, such policies can be required as a new foundation for bilateral-unilateral cooperation on competition. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books, Journals, Papers Aoki, Maki. New issues in FTAs: The case of Economic Partnership Agreements between Japan and ASEAN Countries. IDE APEC Study center. Working Paper Series 03/04-No.8 (2004): 2. English/Publish/Download/ Apec/pdf/2003_08.pdf. Chicago Citation Style. UBC Okanagan Library. February, Accessed December 26, ubc.ca/okanagan/library/ shared/assets/chicago pdf. Chicago Manual of Style Personal Interview. Citesource. Accessed December 26, chicago/chicagointerview_000. pdf. Dabbah. Maher M. International and Comparative Competition Law. New York: Cambridge, Himelfarb, A.J. The International Language of Convergence: Reviving the Antitrust Dialogue between the United States of America and the European Union with a Uniform Understanding of Extraterritoriality. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 909, vol. 17(3): 914, law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume17/issue3/himelfarb17u.pa.j.int lecon.l.909(1996). pdf. Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, Jurnal Persaingan Usaha, 5th edition. Jakarta: Komisi Pe n g a wa s Persaingan Usaha Republik Indonesia, 2011 Michel, Lois. Economic Partnership Agreement: Drivers of Development. Saarbrucken: Dictus Publishing, Papadopoulos, Anestis S. The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. New York: Cambridge, Paul, J.R. Comity in International Law, Harvard International Law Journal 2, vol. 32(1): 3, heinonline.org/hol/print?collec tion=journals&handle=hein.journals/hilj32&id=7 Rill, James F. The U.S./EC Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Genesis, Innovation, and Early Implementation. CPI Antitrust Chronicle, no. 1 (2011): 3. Stark, C. Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation, speech delivered in Washington DC, 23 June Watanabe, Yorizumi Japan s FTA/EPA Policy and Perspectives for East Asian Economic Community. European Institute for Asian Studies. Accessed June 18, japantrade050406/watanabe. pdf. WTO s Working Group on the Interac 46 Journal of World Trade Studies

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50 (phase 2) in Indonesia: the Attached Document, KPPU. Project Design Matrix: Project for Competition Policy (Phase II) Annex 1, KPPU. Outputs and Activities in Record of Discussions (RD), KPPU. Form Digest Green Book 2009, Law Number 5 Year 1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition. KPPU. Accessed December 8, wp-content/uploads/2010/04/ uu-en.pdf. Pemberitahuan Merger KPPU. Accessed October 28, merger/daftar-notifikasi/publikasi-pemberitahuan/pemberitahuan-merger-2011/. Ratification Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan for an economic Partnership. Directorate General of International Trade Cooperation. Accessed December 8, kpi/umum/ijepa/perpres%20 36% pdf. Technical assistance offered and contributed by the Japan Fair Trade Commission. JFTC, Accessed December 3, 2012, menu.2004.pdf. The Antimonopoly Act: Chapter II Private Monopolization and Unreasonable Restraint of Trade. JFTC. Accessed September 23, ama09/02.html. International Organization Documents Day 5 Conference end without consensus. WTO. Accessed December 3, org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm. 48 Journal of World Trade Studies

51 Climate change, labelling, international standards and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement: Are they in (dis)harmony? Michelle Ayu & Joachim Monkelbaan Abstract Climate change and trade are two separate realms that inevitably interact with each other. Trade, representing more than half of global GDP by some accounts, may play a pivotal role in efforts to combat climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The WTO Agreements were not specifically composed for climate change purposes. Labelling and international standards may be used as a trade tool whose application may influence consumer preferences and shift markets. In the context of climate change, labelling may effectively inform consumers about international standards and, in particular, the carbon footprint of products. In the context of WTO Agreements, labelling is governed by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). This article investigates the compatibility of the TBT Agreement in governing labelling aimed at mitigating climate change and it elaborates tensions at the nexus between climate change and trade in the context of labelling. This article eventually argues that climate change, labelling, international standards and the TBT Agreement can be in harmony. Further arrangements, which will close more gaps in the relation between the TBT Agreement and measures aimed at combating climate change, are required to alleviate (possible) tensions in practice. Keywords: Climate change, labelling, international standards, World Trade Organization, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. A. INTRODUCTION Labelling and international standards play an important role in promoting energy efficiency, reducing emissions levels, and mitigating climate change. Labelling may be employed to inform consumers about international standards constituted in products, to communicate carbon footprint data and to gauge energy efficiency performance and the level of emission reduction. Besides, labelling can facilitate trade, spread knowledge, disseminate innovative advances in technology and foster the sharing of good management and conformity assessment practices. The application of labelling and international standards may in turn raise awareness of consumers on their greenhouse gas emissions, which consequently is meant to shift consumers and manufacturers behaviour. A study conducted in 2014 by Vincenzina Caputo, Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr and Riccardo Scarpa reveals that consumers tend to value the CO 2 label at least as much and sometimes even more than the food miles label. 1 1 Vincenzina Caputo, Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr and Riccardo Scarpa. Food miles or carbón emissions? Exploring labelling preference for food Volume V, Number 2, November

52 Labelling and international standards are important for climate action and their significance may increase in the future. For example, the total projected CO 2 emissions from the residential sector in the United States would have been 8 per cent higher by 2020 if the energyefficiency standards for household appliances had not been put in place. Climate change and trade are two distinct realms that inevitably interact with each other. As unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization has brought down tariffs, the market access effects of labelling and international standards as a part of climate change law and policy can have competitiveness impacts on trade and investment. 2 The WTO provides a framework of disciplines to facilitate global trade and serves as a forum to negotiate further trade openness under the architecture of multilateral trade cooperation. 3 The WTO plays accordingly an important role in bridging climate policy and trade transport footprint with a stated choice study. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 57, no. 4 (2013), p World Trade Organization. World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the links between trade, standards and the WTO. Geneva: World Trade Organization, Accessed July 30, anrep_e/world_trade_report05_e.pdf, p. 29. For instances, there are 14,900 international standards published by the ISO and a database of around 650,000 standards (national, regional and international) from about 21 countries is maintained by Perinom, a consortium of European standards organizations. 3 World Trade Organization. The multilateral trading system and climate change: Introduction. Accessed July 19, org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_intro_e. htm. policy. 4 Considering the importance of labelling for informing international standards aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, this article analyses how the WTO covers the dynamic nexus between climate change, international standards and labelling. From the outset, the WTO recognizes the rights and the sovereignty of its members to set diverse levels of policies to reach their respective legitimate objectives as long as they do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries. In the context of setting international standards, WTO members may therefore set distinct levels of international standards in order to achieve their respective legitimate objectives. However, this discretion to determine various levels of legitimate objectives on international standards may possibly be harnessed to veil protectionist measures that have discriminatory consequences. 5 In the context of the WTO, the TBT Agreement has become a main legal instrument when it comes to labelling and international standards. 6 In the TBT Agreement, labelling may be classified either as technical regulation or as stan 4 Ludivine Tamiotti, et. al. Trade and Climate Change: A report by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization. Geneva: World Trade Organization, Accessed July 30, english/res_e/publications_e/trade_climate_ change_e.htm, p Please note that how a measure is justified in the WTO framework as protectionist will not be discussed in this article. 6 The WTO is a treaty consisting of the umbrella agreement, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and its subsidiary agreements, containing of detailed rules. The TBT Agreement is one of its subsidiary agreement. 50 Journal of World Trade Studies

53 dard. The TBT Agreement is aimed to guarantee that the technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures 7 do not constitute unnecessary barriers to international trade while recognizing the right of WTO members to take regulatory measures to achieve their legitimate objective. Among other legitimate objectives, according to Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the legitimate objectives may be: protection of the environment, protection of human health of safety, protection of animal or plant life or health, prevention of deceptive practices, national security requirements and quality requirements. 8 The aim of this article is to clarify the governance of labelling and international standards in the TBT Agreement. This article presents the nexus of technical regulations, standards and labelling under the TBT Agreement and (possible) tensions of technical regulation, standards and labelling particularly in the context of climate change and the TBT Agreement. The wider purpose of this article is to point out the tensions between climate policies and trade policies in the context of labelling and the related important considerations for policy makers. 7 International Organization for Standardization. What is conformity assessment? Accessed May 15, about/conformity-assessment.htm. 8 Artixle XX, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Accessed July 30, pdf and must be read with org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf. B. THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE TERMS TECHNICAL REGULATIONS, STANDARDS AND LABELLING As explicitly mentioned in Annex 1.1 and 1.2 of the TBT Agreement, the TBT Agreement establishes a clear distinction between the terms technical regulations and standards. 9 According to the definition, the main and essential distinction between the terms technical regulations and standards is its compliance. Technical regulations require mandatory compliance. On the other hand, the compliance of standards is not mandatory. In addition, standards have to be approved by a recognized body that provides for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods. 9 The TBT Agreement defines the following terms: i) technical regulation : Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method; and ii) standard : Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method. See further: Annex 1, Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Accessed July 30, ht tps:// tbt.pdf. Volume V, Number 2, November

54 The definitions of both technical regulations and standards in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement identically mention the term labelling requirements. Therefore, labelling requirements may accordingly fall under either technical regulations or standards. Whether a labelling scheme falls under the technical regulation or standards may be ambiguous. The criteria employed to classify whether labelling requirements are a technical regulation or a standard relate to the fact whether compliance is mandatory or not. The finding brought in a new perspective on how technical regulation is identified and how labelling is classified. The finding brought in the panel report of United States Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II (Mexico)) 10, which was subsequently affirmed by the Appellate Body report of the US Tuna II (Mexico), stated: 11 Compliance is mandatory if the document in which [the regulations] are contained has the effect of regulating in a legally binding or compulsory fashion the characteristic at issue, and if it thus prescribes 10 Panel Report, United States Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/R (September 15, 2011). 11 Para , Panel Report, United States Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/R (September 15, 2011). The labelling requirement in the US Tuna II (Mexico) case leaves no discretion to resort to any other standard to inform consumers about the dolphin-safety of tuna than to meet the specific requirements of the measure and is the only standard available to address the issue. or imposes in a binding or compulsory fashion that a certain product must or must not possess certain characteristics, terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labels or that it must or must not be produced by using certain processes and production methods. By contrast, compliance with the characteristics or other features laid out in the document would not be mandatory if compliance with them was discretionary or voluntary. Conversely, the dissenting opinion expressed at the Panel of the US Tuna II case may be worth considering. The dissenting opinion mentioned: Both Annex 1.1 and Annex 1.2 refer to labelling requirements. Labelling requirements can thus be technical regulations or standards. The criteria whether labelling requirements are a technical regulation or a standard relates to the fact whether compliance is mandatory or not. In order to give any sense to the term labelling requirement as used both in Annex 1.1. and 1.2, the requirement that compliance is mandatory cannot relate to the obligation to meet certain requirements to be allowed to use the label, but to the question whether a labelling scheme is compulsory i.e. whether products must use a label in order to be marketed or voluntary i.e. products may be marketed with or without the label. As indicated by the Appellate Body in EC Asbestos, a technical regulation must regulate the characteristics of products in a binding or compulsory fashion and a technical regulation has the effect of prescribing or imposing 52 Journal of World Trade Studies

55 one or more characteristics features, qualities, attributes, or other distinguishing mark.315 A labelling requirement which is a technical regulation would thus impose to a product the obligation to use the label and to fulfil the related labelling requirements. If however compliance with the labelling requirement and use of the label is not mandatory, the labelling requirement has to be seen as a standard. Arguing that the mere fact that a product is prohibited from using a label if it does not fulfil these standards makes compliance compulsory would leave no space for voluntary labelling schemes as standards. 12 (emphasis added) Despite having been affirmed by the Appellate Body report, the opaque nature of the distinction between technical regulations and standards in the TBT Agreement remains disputable. The labelling requirements, whose compliance is mandatory, are classified under the technical regulations. Conversely, the labelling requirements, whose compliance is voluntary, may be categorized under standards. The distinctive compliance nature between technical regulations and standards burdens dissimilar notification obligations between both categories. Measures considered as technical regulations have to be notified to the WTO Secretariat, while measures deemed as standards may be notified on a voluntary basis. 12 Para , Panel Report, United States Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/R (September 15, 2011). C. TENSIONS: CLIMATE CHANGE, LABELLING AND THE TBT AGREEMENT Although the WTO recognizes sustainable development as its central principle 13, the WTO Agreements were not designed to specifically tackle the issue of climate change. Consequently, the interplay between the WTO and climate change regimes may result some tensions. Labelling schemes are used as a means to gauge environmental effectiveness and to promote energy-efficiency policy. Their application may inevitably build up consumer awareness, acceptance of labels (credibility and understanding) and changes in consumer and manufacturer behaviour. 14 Hence, the application of labelling schemes may impact competitiveness of a market. This article attempts to compile 13 The term sustainable development is explicitly mentioned in the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization: Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development. (Emphasis added) 14 Ludivine Tamiotti, et. al, op. cit., p.124. Volume V, Number 2, November

56 tensions that emerged or may occur between the applications of labelling, international standards, in particular for the purpose of climate change, and the TBT Agreement. These tensions may become useful information as well as considerations for policy-makers. 1. Non-product-related process and production methods and the TBT Agreement Processes and production methods (PPMs) refer to criteria of governing international trade in goods and services according to the inputs and process technologies utilised in their production. 15 PPMs play a pivotal role for the environmental impacts and the emission of the GHGs. For example, the use of energy-efficient technology in the production method of a product directly affects emissions reduction. Therefore, PPMs are important criteria which may bring essential environmental benefits. In the debate over trade and environment, PPMs are the subject of many controversies. 16 The applicability of environmental PPMs creates controversy due to the following reasons: 17 First, a PPM can restrict trade or make it harder and costlier for an exporter to supply a foreign market. Second, PPMs are a signal from importing countries to exporting countries about the environmental practices and laws that the importing country thinks the exporting country should have. PPMs are classified according to how the products were produced. 18 PPMs are categorized as product-related PPMs (pr-ppms) and non-product-related PPMs (npr-ppms). The key issue of these two categories is the influence of process and production methods on final products. If a process and production method will affect the final product to be treated differently in its use, handling or disposal, this is pr-ppms. Conversely, if the final products will appear the same despite its process and production method and, thus, no different treatment on the final products are needed, this is npr-ppms. The PPMs are explicitly pronounced by several WTO Agreements. Several WTO Agreements confirm that PPMs affect trade. 19 PPMs related technical regulations, standards and labels fall explicit 15 Robert Read, Process and Production Methods and the Regulations of International Trade. In The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade: Recent Trade Disputes between the European Union and the United States, edited by Nicholas Perdikis and Robert Read, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Accessed July 30, org/dsd/tool-kit/documentos/moduleiiidoc/ Read%20Article%20on%20PPMs.pdf, p Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality. Yale Journal of International Law 27, no. 1 (2002), p Steve Charnovitz, op. cit., p Laurens J. Ankersmit and Jessica C. Lawrence, The Future of Environmental Labelling: US Tuna II and the Scope of the TBT. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 39, no. 1 (2012), p Aaron Cosbey in ICTSD Bridges: Between trade and sustainable development. The WTO and PPMs: Time to Drop a Taboo. Accessed February 3, p Journal of World Trade Studies

57 ly under the TBT Agreement. 20 PPMs that fall outside the scope of the TBT Agreement may fall either in the Agreement in the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) or in the GATT. 21 In general, the WTO Agreements distinguished between pr-ppms and npr-ppms; discriminatory treatment on the basis of pr-ppms, which have different physical characteristic as the final result of the product, is permissible in WTO law. 22 In connection to the issue of pr- PPM in the GATT, the Appellate Body in Japan Alcoholic Beverages II stipulated that likeness may be determined by comparing products on the basis of (i) product characteristics, (ii) end-uses, (iii) consumer preferences and (iv) tariff classification. 23 Moreover, the Appellate Body in the EC Asbestos case added 20 Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau and Julia Reinaud. The Interface between the Trade and Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues. Journal of World Trade 46, no. 3 (2012), p This article will not discuss the issue of PPMs which fall under the SPS Agreement. Note that the preamble of the SPS Agreement explicitly pronounced that the GATT provisions related to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, particularly Article XX(b) GATT regarding the general exception clause, apply to the SPS Agreement. 22 The United Nations Environment Programme Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, Economics and Trade Branch; and the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Environment and Trade: A handbook - 2 nd edition. Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development, Accessed July 30, envirotrade_handbook_2005.pdf, p Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau and Julia Reinaud, loc. cit., p the competitive relationship between imported and domestic products as a determinant to justify likeness of products. 24 A PPM can affect the like product determination if it affects a competitive relationship. 25 Therefore, the comparison of products on the basis of productrelated PPMs may simply be determined as unlike due to its distinct product characteristics. Conclusively, there will be no conflict created concerning the likeness justification for pr-ppms, provided that the final products will be distinctive. The issue of npr-ppms is essential in the context of climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions. The npr-ppms base a number of energyefficiency and emission-reduction standards and labelling schemes. 26 In the WTO Agreements, there are no explicit reference to the issue of npr-ppms. Unlike the pr-ppms, the issue of npr-ppms may be problematic. In the WTO context, discriminatory treatment is not allowed for products which are considered like products. Products included in the npr-ppms will remain like products and cannot in turn be treated differently. Under the category of npr- PPMs, there will be no traceable distinction resulting from the process and production method of products. Although products have different processes and production methods and may have dif 24 Para. 101, Appellate Body Report, European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001). 25 Inside U.S. Trade. Experts sees possible opening in WTO rules for certain PPMs Accessed January 29, org/pressroom/documents/iustarticle.pdf,p Ludivine Tamiotti, et. al, op. cit., p.126. Volume V, Number 2, November

58 ferent environmental impacts, there are no traceable product characteristics that may justify the products to be treated differently. In the context of GATT, harnessing the npr-ppms as a factor to treat product differently will consequently infringe the non-discrimination principle under the GATT. 27 Nevertheless, the infringement accorded to the issue of the npr- PPMs may be justified by referring to the general exception clause provided by the GATT. Article XX of the GATT refers to the general exception clause. Two-tier analysis requirements are required to justify GATT-inconsistent environmental measures through the general exception clause. The measure has to firstly fall under at least one of the exception listed under Article XX. Secondly, the measure has to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau, of Article XX. The chapeau of Article XX requires that the measure is not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail and is not a disguised restriction on international trade. In conjunction with the issue of climate change, Article XX of the GATT provides two relevant exceptions to not complying with GATT obligations, i.e. point (b) and (g) of Article XX of the 27 The non discrimination non-discrimination principle is particularly pronounced under Article I of the GATT, which entails the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment obligation, and Article III of the GATT, which pertains to the national treatment obligation. GATT. WTO members may seek exceptions from GATT provisions on the basis that the measures taken are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health 28 ; and measures which are relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 29 Unlike the GATT, the application of the npr-ppms under the TBT Agreement has been a matter of controversy among academics and practitioners. 30 The TBT Agreement has a different approach than the GATT in providing spaces to obtain various level of legitimate objectives, including climate change. The GATT provides an exhaustive list of general exceptions in Article XX accommodating various legitimate objectives. As an exception, the application of the general exception depends whether an infringement against GATT obligations exists. Unlike the GATT, the TBT Agreement provides a non-exhaustive list of various legitimate objectives. The TBT Agreement does not place targeting a legitimate objective as an exception of infringing any TBT Agreement obligations. In conclusion, in the framework of the TBT Agreement, pursuing a legitimate 28 Article XX (b), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Accessed July 30, ht tps:// gatt.pdf and must be read with wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf. 29 Article XX (g), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, ibid. 30 Johannes Norpoth. Mysteries of the TBT Agreement Resolved? Lessons to Learn for Climate Policies and Developing Country Exporters from Recent TBT Disputes. Journal of World Trade 47, no. 3 (2013), p Journal of World Trade Studies

59 objective is a rights and not an exception. The development of treaty interpretations of WTO Agreements, including the GATT and the TBT Agreement, has to be managed in a harmonious way in order to obtain consistent interpretations. Regardless the different application on how the GATT and the TBT Agreement provide a space to pursue a legitimate objective, the GATT and the TBT Agreement have to accordingly be interpreted in a consistent way. In the Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, the words their related confine the scope of the TBT Agreement only to pr-ppms. 31 Meanwhile, the US Tuna I case resumed that the npr-ppms may solely be examined under the GATT. 32 It seems to be inefficient if the npr-ppms are possibly justifiable under the GATT, while the more transparent pr-ppms are subject to the more stringent requirements of the TBT Agreement. 33 The US Tuna II (Mexico) case is important for the nexus between npr- PPMs and the TBT Agreement. Notwithstanding the finding of the US Tuna I, the Panel of US Tuna II came to a contradictory finding. In its finding, the npr-ppm measures may fall under the TBT Agreement based on the second 31 Laurens J. Ankersmit and Jessica C. Lawrence, op. cit., p In addition, Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement states Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory (emphasis added). 32 Laurens J. Ankersmit and Jessica C. Lawrence, ibid. 33 Patrick Low, Gabrielle Marceau and Julia Reinaud, op. cit., p sentence of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement. The second sentence of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement clearly indicates that labelling including its application to a product, process or production method falls under the scope of the TBT Agreement. This sentence does not establish the division of PPMs. Considering that there was no particular appeal on the coverage of the npr-ppm in the TBT Agreement brought by the US to the Appellate Body in the US Tuna II (Mexico) case, there may be a differing finding pertaining to the applicability of the npr-ppm measures in the TBT Agreement in the future. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body report in the US Tuna II (Mexico) seemingly accepted that labelling is covered by TBT Agreement. If the Appellate Body had the opposite view pertaining to the coverage of the TBT Agreement on labelling, the dispute would not make further findings about labelling in the framework of the TBT Agreement. Accordingly, the US Tuna II (Mexico) case seemingly clarified the TBT Agreement coverage on the npr-ppms that fall under the categories explicitly mentioned by the second sentence of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, i.e. terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements. Nonetheless, the categories outside what are explicitly mentioned in the second sentence of the Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, i.e. outside terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements, remain unresolved. Accordingly, the issue of the TBT Agreement coverage on the npr-ppms remains debatable and has no definite clarity yet among WTO members. Despite the fact that the npr-ppms may contribute to mitigate GHG emis Volume V, Number 2, November

60 sions, many countries argue that discriminatory measures based on npr- PPMs are inconsistent with the WTO. 34 Should the discriminatory measures accorded to the npr-ppms be justifiable, it is envisaged to create challenges and complexities. For instance, in reference to the justification whether a measures is necessary to pursue a legitimate objective or is a disguised protectionism. 2. International standards governance: The interplay between obligations and flexibility In line with the growing economic interdependence that results from international trade, the function of international standards is increasingly important. International standards are an essential means of facilitating compatibility and interoperability for intermediate products as they zigzag their way to the final consumer in a globalized world where value chains are increasingly prevalent. 35 In general, the TBT Agreement strongly encourages WTO members to use relevant international standards as the basis for their technical regulations. In the context of WTO Agreements, such 34 World Trade Organization: The WTO Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation. Detailed Presentation of Environmental Requirements and Market Access, including Labelling for Environmental Purposes. Accessed July 30, Course_385/Module_2423/ModuleDocuments/ TE_Req-L2-R2-E.pdf, p Erik Wijkstrom and Devin McDaniels. Improving regulatory governance: International standards and the WTO TBT Agreement. Journal of World Trade 47, no. 5 (2013), p international standards are mentioned in particular in Article , and of the TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement provides WTO members flexibilities to set standards and to em 36 Article 2.4, Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Accessed July 30, org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf. Article 2.4 states: Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exists or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems. 37 Article 2.5, Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Accessed July 30, pdf. Article 2.5 mentions: Whenever a technical regulation is prepared, adopted or applied for one of the legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2, and is in accordance with relevant international standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade. 38 Article 5.4, Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Accessed July 30, pdf. Article 5.4 says: In cases where a positive assurance is required that products conform with technical regulations or standards, and relevant guides or recommendations issued by international standardizing bodies exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall ensure that central government bodies use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their conformity assessment procedures, except where, as duly explained upon request, such guides or recommendations or relevant parts are inappropriate for the Members concerned, for, inter alia, such reasons as: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment; fundamental climatic or other geographical factors; fundamental technological or infrastructural problems. 58 Journal of World Trade Studies

61 ploy relevant international standards on the appointed standards. Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement mentions the term inter alia twice, i.e. pertaining to the list of legitimate objectives as well as relevant elements of consideration for risk assessment. The term inter alia indicates the open list of both the legitimate objectives and considerations for risk assessment. Furthermore, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement states that a technical regulation set for a legitimate objective by a member will be presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade as long as it is in accordance with relevant international standards. In the panel report of the US- Tuna II (Mexico) case, the panel defined an international standard as a standard that is adopted by an international standardizing body and is made to the public. 39 Nevertheless, WTO members are allowed not to use relevant international standards when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of their respective legitimate objectives pursued. Furthermore, the TBT Agreement obliges WTO members 39 Para , Panel Report, United States Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/R (September 15, 2011). The panel added that it must constitute a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context (paras , ) and be open on a non-discriminatory basis to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO members in accordance with the principle of openness as described in the TBT Committee Decision (paras ). to notify whenever a relevant international standard does not exist or the technical content of a proposed technical regulation is not in accordance with the technical content of relevant international standards. Governing international standards is a complex issue. Each WTO member has the sovereignty to set the subject and the level of legitimate objectives. Each member may choose its relevant international standard applied in a particular goods or service. Consequently, the standards governance differs from member to member. Concerning the use of relevant international standards as stipulated in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, the following three-step analysis may resume a measure to be in violation of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement: (i) the existence or imminent completion of a relevant international standard; (ii) whether the international standard has been used as a basis for the technical regulation; and (iii) whether the international standard is an effective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, taking into account fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems. 40 The non-harmonized governance of international standards setting may constitute inevitable-international-trade barriers, among other possible tensions: 1. The more-stringent governance of standards and choice of relevant 40 Para. 48, the TBT Agreement, World Trade Organization. WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice. Accessed January 17, booksp_e/analytic_index_e/analytic_index_e. htm. Volume V, Number 2, November

62 international standards are trade barriers for some WTO members which set more-lenient standard governance. The more-stringent standards, which are in accordance with relevant international standards, are rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade. Therefore, the more-stringent standards may not be fulfilled by some members and hamper international trade. 2. There is no consensus and precise methods on how to quantify a carbon-footprint. 41 The proliferation of carbon-footprint standards may raise a question how the carbon content is evaluated. Furthermore, the lack of having a uniformed means in evaluating carbon content and in applying a particular carbonfootprint standard globally add the tension on a carbon-footprint. 3. The TBT Agreement does not name particular international standardizing bodies to set international standards. Ensuring international standards, which are in consonant with the objectives of the TBT Agreement, may be challenging since the nature of every international standardizing body may (not) be in line with the objectives of the TBT Agreement. 4. The tension of having duplication of relevant international standards in particular goods and services may be undeniable due to flexibilities given by the TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement has not pronounced 41 Olga Nartova. Carbon labelling: Moral, economic and legal implication in a world trade environment. NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper no. 2009/5 (February 2009), p. 4. particular international standardizing body. In consequence, there is a growing competitiveness among international standardizing bodies. In the context of setting climate change as a legitimate objective, it still remains unclear which climate change standards could be regarded as international standards in line with the objective of the TBT Agreement. 42 On one hand, the non-harmonized governance of international standards may be used to set protectionist policies covered as climate change objectives. On the other hand, there should be discretion for putting legitimate, non-discriminatory and effective measures in place for addressing climate change. 3. The WTO coverage on private standards The TBT Agreement disciplines standardizing bodies and principles for international standardizing bodies. Nevertheless, the TBT Agreement s main focus is on technical regulations instead of standards. 43 In this regard, the TBT Agreement treats standards separately. 44 The TBT Agreement is restrictive in accommodating the issue of private standards. 42 Joost Pauwelyn, Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO law In Research Handbook on Environment, Health, and the WTO, edited by Geert Van Calster and Denise Prévost, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013, p Erik Wijkstrom. TBT and Private Standards. Accessed July 30, wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/private_standards_june07_e/wijkstrom_e.ppt. 44 Erik Wijkstrom, TBT and Private Standards, ibid. 60 Journal of World Trade Studies

63 Appleton opined that :45 Private labelling schemes fall outside the Agreement because (i) they are not promulgated by recognised standardising bodies; (ii) they do not rely on standards as defined in Annex 1; (iii) the non-governmental bodies in question may not satisfy the conditions of Annex 1.8 of the TBT Agreement; and (iv) the TBT probably does not apply to standards governing npr- PPMs. In connection with private standards 46, the TBT Agreement does not specifically mention the term private standardisation organizations. Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement only explicitly defines the terms technical regulation, standards, conformity assessment procedures, international body or system, regional body or system, central government body, local government body and non-governmental body. In this regard, the question may be whether private standardisation organizations may be incorporated in one of the specific definitions under Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. Private standards and private labelling schemes are discerned as a response to consumer demand and perhaps even as a means of creating demand. 47 Private 45 Arthur E. Appleton. Linking Energy, Climate Change and WTO Law: The Role of the WTO in the Energy and Climate Change Debate. Accessed February 30, org/pdf/2009/climate_change_labeling.pdf. 46 Note that private standards are set by private standardizing organizations. 47 Arthur E. Appleton. Private climate change standards and labelling schemes under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. In parties may be construed into two categories, i.e. entities which are not organs of the State but which nevertheless exercise elements of governmental authority and private corporations or individuals that are not organs of State under internal law and that do not exercise elements of governmental authority. 48 Private standards and private labelling schemes are operated on a voluntary basis. There is a debate whether the TBT Agreement may govern the proliferation of private standards and private labelling schemes. Appleton argued that: 49 The definition of standard in Annex 1.2 uses the phrase document approved by a recognized body. The phrase recognized body is undefined and the TBT Agreement does not state who must recognize such bodies. For an entity not identified in the WTO Agreement, a panel is likely to determine whether the entity is: (i) recognized by one or more WTO International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change: World Trade Forum, edited by Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p Samir R. Gandhi. Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules and the Global Decision-Making Processes. Paper presented at the third global administrative law seminar, Viterbo, June 15 16, Accessed July 30, iilj.org/gal/documents/ghandienvironment. pdf, p. 13. See also: The GATT Panel decision in the Japan=Restrictions on the Import of Certain Agricultural Products case, BISD 35S/163, adopted 2 February 1988 (Japan Agricultural Products), at para Arthur E. Appleton. Supermarket labels and the TBT Agreement: Mind the gap. Accessed February 30, edu/blr/04/1appleton.pdf. Volume V, Number 2, November

64 members as a standardization body, (ii) involved with the activities of international standardization organizations (ISO, IEC, etc.), (iii) open to involvement from other WTO members, and (iv) has accepted the Code, (v) whether any WTO Members apply standards promulgated by the entity, and (vi) if the aim of its standards further a legitimate objective within TBT Article 2.2. If private standards and private labelling schemes are deemed to fall under the TBT Agreement, Article 4 of the TBT Agreement (Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards) as well as Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement (Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards) will be applicable. In his article, Appleton elaborates further governance of private standards and private labelling according to the TBT Agreement as follows: 50 Standardizing bodies that are bound by the Code or have accepted its obligations are required to accord mostfavoured-nation and national treatment to like products. Their standards must not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade, and they are required to use relevant international standards when they exist or their completion is imminent. Nevertheless, should private standards and private labelling scheme not be covered and fall outside the purview of the TBT Agreement, the inability of the TBT Agreement to cover private 50 Arthur E. Appleton. Supermarket labels and the TBT Agreement: Mind the gap, op. cit. standards and the proliferation of private standards in itself may result de facto non-tariff barriers to trade. Manufacturers will face various private standards that act as as trade barriers, in particular for smaller suppliers that may find it challenging to comply with the standard. Due to the absence of WTO coverage of private standards, there will be little room to bring the issue to the WTO dispute settlement should a dispute emerges. Private schemes may disadvantage exports from smaller producers in developing countries without necessarily bringing the environmental benefits that such schemes are expected to deliver. 51 D. CASE STUDY: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CERTAIN MEMBER STATES CERTAIN MEASURES ON THE IMPORTATION AND MARKETING OF BIODIESEL AND MEASURES SUPPORTING THE BIODIESEL INDUSTRY (WT/ DS459/1) 52 This article refers to a WTO dispute The European Union and certain member states certain measures on the importation and marketing of biodiesel and measures supporting the biodiesel industry (WT/DS459/1) as a case study. This dispute reveals an example of pos 51 Arthur E. Appleton. Private climate change standards and labelling schemes under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, op. cit., p Request for Consultations, European Union and Certain Member States Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures supporting the Biodiesel Industry, WT/DS459/1 (May 15, 2013). 62 Journal of World Trade Studies

65 sible tensions between climate change and trade realms. The European Union (EU) adopted Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/ EC which are subsequently applied on various policies by the EU members. In the field of renewable energy, the Directive set a sustainability criterion with which biofuels and bioliquids have to comply in order to be taken into account when measuring compliance with the targets of the EU members. The biofuels and bioliquids which fulfilled this criterion may benefit from (financial) incentives for their use. The EU regulation is based on concerns over the real benefits that biofuels can deliver in terms of GHG savings once the indirect land use change (ILUC) impacts of biofuels are taken into account. The sustainability criteria set, among other criteria, by the EU require: (i) biofuels must produce in the saving of at least 35% of greenhouse gas emissions with respect to fossil fuels; and (ii) biofuels feedstock production cannot occur on certain types of land with a specific function or status before Argentina, the complainant in the dispute, has no objection to the use of sustainability criteria and a calculation method of greenhouse gas emissions savings. Argentina questions the threshold of 35% of greenhouse gas emissions with respect to fossil fuels. The soybean biodiesel produced in Argentina has only 31% of the default value. Hence, the soybean biodiesel of Argentina cannot fulfil the sustainability criteria set by the EU. Argentina argues that the threshold is arbitrary, not based on scientific justifications, and not based on a recognized international norm or standard. The dispute is still at the consultation stage in the WTO dispute settlement process upon the submission of this article. 53 Any developments and possible resulted findings from this dispute will be important in projecting the interface between climate and trade regimes. E. CONCLUSION The nexus between trade, in the context of multilateral trading system, and climate change regimes, labelling and international standards may be used as effective instruments in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, the relation may facilitate as a tool to measure the level of carbon emitted in products. However, the relevant WTO Agreement covering the issue of labelling and international standards, the TBT Agreement, is not particularly aimed at governing climate change. Therefore, the compatibility of the TBT Agreement with measures to combat climate change in the form of labelling and international standards becomes increasingly important. The findings of related cases adjudicated by Panel or Appellate Body of the WTO dispute settlement and special trade concerns raised by WTO members on the trade and environment and the TBT committee meetings (are meant to) close some gaps between the area of standards covered by the TBT Agreement and climate change policies. 53 This article is submitted on July 30th, Volume V, Number 2, November

66 Nevertheless, noting the distinct governance of technical regulations, standards and labels among countries may still bring along ambiguities for the trade community and be used as a tool for disguised protectionism. Moreover, the uncertainty whether the TBT Agreement accommodates the issue of npr-ppms outside the terminologies explicitly mentioned in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement and the issue of private standards governance may result trade barriers and unresolved tensions. Climate change, labelling, international standards and the TBT Agreement are not yet in an absolute harmony. Further arrangements are needed for making the TBT Agreement more compatible and accommodative with various measures aimed at combating climate change, including the application of labelling and international standards. BIBLIOGRAPHY Regulations Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Accessed July 30, legal_e/17-tbt.pdf. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Accessed July 30, must be read with wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ gatt47_e.pdf. Books Appleton, Arthur E. Private climate change standards and labelling schemes under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. In International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change: World Trade Forum, edited by Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Pauwelyn, Joost. Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO law In Research Handbook on Environment, Health, and the WTO, edited by Geert Van Calster and Denise Prévost, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Read, Robert. Process and Production Methods and the Regulations of International Trade. In The WTO and the Regulation of International Trade: Recent Trade Disputes between the European Union and the United States, edited by Nicholas Perdikis and Robert Read, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Accessed July 30, Read%20Article%20on%20 PPMs.pdf. Tamiotti, Ludivine, et. al. Trade and Climate Change: A report by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization. Geneva: World Trade Organization, Accessed July 30, english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_ climate_change_e.pdf. The United Nations Environment Programme Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, Economics and Trade Branch; and 64 Journal of World Trade Studies

67 the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Environment and Trade: A handbook - 2 nd edition. Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development, Accessed July 30, ch/etb/areas/pdf/envirotrade_ handbook_2005.pdf. World Trade Organization. World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the links between trade, standards and the WTO. Geneva: World Trade Organization, Accessed July 30, world_trade_report05_e.pdf. Articles Ankersmit, Laurens J. and Jessica C. Lawrence. The Future of Environmental Labelling: US Tuna II and the Scope of the TBT. Legal Issues of Economic Integration 39, no. 1 (2012): Caputo, Vincenzina, Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr and Riccardo Scarpa. Food miles or carbón emissions? Exploring labelling preference for food transport footprint with a stated choice study. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 57, no. 4 (2013): Charnovitz, Steve. The Law of Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality. Yale Journal of International Law 27, no. 1 (2002): Gandhi, Samir R. Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules and the Global Decision- Making Processes. Paper presented at the third global administrative law seminar, Viterbo, June 15 16, Accessed July 30, gal/documents/ghandienvironment.pdf. Low, Patrick, Gabrielle Marceau and Julia Reinaud. The Interface between the Trade and Climate Change Regimes: Scoping the Issues. Journal of World Trade 46, no. 3 (2012): Nartova, Olga. Carbon labelling: Moral, economic and legal implication in a world trade environment. NCCR Trade Regulation Working Paper no. 2009/5 (February 2009): Norpoth, Johannes. Mysteries of the TBT Agreement Resolved? Lessons to Learn for Climate Policies and Developing Country Exporters from Recent TBT Disputes. Journal of World Trade 47, no. 3 (2013): Wijkström, Erik and Devin McDaniels. Improving regulatory governance: International standards and the WTO TBT Agreement. Journal of World Trade 47, no. 5 (2013): Cases United States Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/R (September 15, 2011). European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R (March Volume V, Number 2, November

68 12, 2001). European Union and Certain Member States Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures supporting the Biodiesel Industry, WT/ DS459/1 (May 15, 2013). Websites Appleton, Arthur E. Linking Energy, Climate Change and WTO Law: The Role of the WTO in the Energy and Climate Change Debate. Accessed February 30, climate_change_labeling.pdf. Appleton, Arthur E. Supermarket labels and the TBT Agreement: Mind the gap. Accessed February 30, blr/04/1appleton.pdf. Cosbey, Aaron in ICTSD Bridges: Between trade and sustainable development. The WTO and PPMs: Time to Drop a Taboo. Accessed February 3, ictsd.org/downloads/bridges/ bridges5-1.pdf. International Organization for Standardization. What is conformity assessment? Accessed May 15, home/about/conformity-assessment.htm. Inside U.S. Trade. Experts sees possible opening in WTO rules for certain PPMs Accessed January 29, pressroom/documents/iustarticle.pdf. Wijkstrom, Erik. TBT and Private Standards. Accessed July 30, tratop_e/sps_e/private_standards_june07_e/wijkstrom_e.ppt. World Trade Organization. The multilateral trading system and climate change: Introduction. Accessed July 19, org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ climate_intro_e.htm. World Trade Organization. WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice. Accessed January 17, english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/analytic_index_e.htm. World Trade Organization: The WTO Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation. Detailed Presentation of Environmental Requirements and Market Access, including Labelling for Environmental Purposes. Accessed July 30, org/admin/files/course_385/ Module_2423/ModuleDocuments/TE_Req-L2-R2-E.pdf. 66 Journal of World Trade Studies

69 Analisis Perkembangan Integrasi Ekonomi Asean Menuju Pemberlakuan Asean Economic Community (AEC) Tahun 2015 Primadiana Yunita Abstraksi Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan alasan yang melatarbelakangi ASEAN tetap melakukan integrasi ekonomi melalui ASEAN Economic Community pada tahun 2015 walaupun prasyarat sebagai komunitas ekonomi belum terpenuhi. Arikel ini menggunakan konsep identitas yang diutarakan oleh Amitav Acharya untuk menjelaskan bahwa keterlibatan dan kepatuhan negara dalam suatu integrasi regional jika tidak berdasarkan pemanfaatan materil yang secara matematis dapat ditentukan, maka integrasi bisa berdasarkan tatanan identitas yang berkembang di antara negara anggota untuk bersepakat mencapai suatu tujuan bersama. Artikel ini memprediksi bahwa ASEAN Economic Community tidak akan menghasilkan perubahan secara materiil terhadap masing-masing negara anggota ASEAN. Akan tetapi dengan mendorong integrasi ekonomi yang dilakukan melalui berbagai kesepakatan serta kerjasama ekonomi dalam perdagangan barang, jasa, ASEAN akan mampu memperkuat identitas kolektifnya. Kata kunci: integrasi ekonomi, AEC, identitas kolektif A. PENDAHULUAN Penerapan ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) atau Komunitas Ekonomi ASEAN yang akan dimulai pada 31 Desember 2015 akan menjadi babak baru bagi pengembangan perekonomian ASEAN. Penerapan ASEAN Economic Community ini sebenarnya dipercepat dari jadwal semula yakni pada tahun 2020 menjadi tahun AEC dimaksudkan untuk menjadi pasar tunggal dan basis produksi, dengan pergerakan bebas barang, jasa, investasi, tenaga kerja terampil dan aliran modal lebih bebas. AEC juga diharapkan dapat membantu perkembangan ekonomi yang merata di kawasan dan mengurangi kemiskinan dan kesenjangan ekonomi-sosial pada tahun Dalam lingkup ASEAN bentuk kesepakatan yang ada sekarang ini bukan lagi berbentuk kerja sama ekonomi namun sudah merupakan integrasi ekonomi. Dalam literatur ekonomi dan politik dikenal ada beberapa tahapan integrasi ekonomi regional. Tahapan integrasi tersebut terdiri dari (1) Preferential Trading Area (PTA), (2) Free Trade Area (FTA), (3) Customs Union; (4) Common Market, (5) Economic and 1 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Vision 2020, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 15 December Diakses melalui pada tanggal 20 Januari Volume V, Number 2, November

70 Monetary Union (Economic Community). Tahapan integrasi ekonomi ini bersifat berjenjang, dari yang paling sederhana yaitu Preferential Trade Area (PTA) sampai yang paling komprehensif yaitu Economic and Monetary Union (economic community). 2 Preferential Trading Area (PTA) merupakan blok perdagangan yang memberikan keistimewaan untuk produk-produk tertentu dari negara tertentu dengan melakukan pengurangan tarif namun tidak menghilangkannya sama sekali. Free Trade Area merupakan tahapan di mana sekelompok negara melakukan perjanjian untuk menghapus seluruh hambatan perdagangan (tarif dan kuota) antarsesama anggota, namun tetap dapat memberlakukan hambatan perdagangan untuk negara lain (non-anggota). Custom union merupakan tahapan di mana selain hambatan internal telah dihapus, ditetapkan pula tarif eksternal yang seragam untuk setiap negara anggota. 3 Common market merupakan suatu custom union yang di dalamnya ditetapkan kebijakan-kebijakan umum yang tidak hanya terbatas pada masalah perdagangan internasional saja. Economic and Monetary Union (Economic Community) merupakan common market plus di mana di dalamnya terdapat adanya perpaduan kebijakan mengenai perpajakan, tenaga kerja, serta pembentukan mata uang tunggal bersama (common currency) dan bank sentral tunggal. Untuk mencapai tahapan terakhir dari integrasi ekonomi tersebut terdapat sejumlah persyaratan yang harus dimiliki oleh setiap negara anggota. Persyaratan tersebut mencakup masalah moneter, fiskal, dan juga industri. 4 Apabila melihat integrasi yang tengah dilakukan oleh ASEAN yang meliputi adanya aliran bebas perdagangan (barang dan jasa), arus bebas investasi, modal dan tenaga kerja, hal ini dapat dikategorikan bahwa integrasi yang dilakukan di ASEAN belum sampai pada tahap Komunitas Ekonomi (Economic Community). 5 Selain itu, apabila melihat kondisi internal ASEAN dalam menghadapi ASEAN Economic Community yang sudah berada di depan mata ini ada beberapa permasalahan yang akan menjadi hambatan bagi negara ASEAN di antaranya adalah rendahnya transaksi perdagangan antaranegara ASEAN. Menurut data statistik perdagangan ASEAN, sampai tahun 2012, pasar di luar ASEAN adalah pasar yang besar dengan porsi sebesar 75 persen dari total ekspor ASEAN. Di tahun 2012, ekspor ASEAN ke China adalah yang terbesar dengan porsi 31.7 persen, kemudian diikuti oleh Uni Eropa sebesar 2 Thomas G. Aquino. What is the ASEAN Economic Community? Philippines International Symposium on Creating the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) hosted by Japan Economic Foundation and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Seoul, Republic of Korea October 27 & 28, Diakses melalui go.kr/include/filedown.jsp?fname=session2_ Dr%20Aquino.pdf&fpath=news06, pada tanggal 10 November Ibid 4 Ibid 5 Thomas G. Aquino. What is the ASEAN Economic Community? Philippines International Symposium on Creating the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) hosted by Japan Economic Foundation and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Seoul, Republic of Korea October 27 & 28, Diakses melalui go.kr/include/filedown.jsp?fname=session2_ Dr%20Aquino.pdf&fpath=news06, pada tanggal 10 November Journal of World Trade Studies

71 27.1 persen. 6 Rendahnya perdagangan intra-asean ini antara lain dikarenakan masih adanya hambatan non-tarif, perbedaan standar produk dan belum harmonisnya prosedur bea cukai. Selain itu, persoalan lain yang sama pentingnya adalah kurang populernya skema CEPT (Common Effective Preferential Tariff) dan belum kuatnya mekanisme penyelesaian masalah perdagangan. 7 Pada sektor jasa, sebagaimana digariskan dalam AEC Blueprint, target yang harus dicapai hingga tahun 2013 adalah bahwa jasa yang diberikan oleh penyedia jasa luar negeri kepada pengguna jasa dalam negeri dan kepada konsumen domestik yang sedang berada di negeri penyedia jasa harus dibebaskan. Dalam hal jasa tersebut, sebagian negara anggota ASEAN telah memenuhi target, sedangkan negara Filipina dan Vietnam belum mencapai target yang sudah disepakati. 8 Permasalahan lain yang muncul dari dalam ASEAN sendiri adalah masih adanya ketimpangan pembangunan ekonomi yang sangat besar antarnegara anggota di ASEAN. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari salah satu indikator yaitu pendapat 6 ASEAN Trade Database dalam ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook Diakses melalui pada tanggal 13 Maret Luhulima et. al, hal Departemen Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. Menuju ASEAN Economic Community Diakses melalui go.id/website_kpi/umum/setditjen/buku%20 Menuju%20ASEAN%20ECONOMIC%20COM MUNITY% pdf, pada tanggal 2 Februari an perkapita. Data menunjukkan bahwa rata-rata pendapatan perkapita ASEAN-6 (Malaysia, Singapura, Thailand, Indonesia, Filipina dan Brunei) 10 kali lebih besar daripada Kamboja, Laos, Myanmar dan Vietnam. Negara-negara seperti Malaysia dan Singapura sudah jauh meninggalkan negara-negara yang baru saja bergabung dengan ASEAN, yaitu Kamboja, Laos, Myanmar, dan Vietnam (CLMV). 9 Adanya ketimpangan pembangunan ekonomi yang terjadi antara anggota ASEAN tersebut muncul karena prestasi pembangunan negara-negara ASEAN berbeda satu sama lain. Ada kelompok negara yang sudah berorientasi ekspor dengan industrialisasinya seperti Singapura, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia,dan Filipina sedangkan negara lainnya masih mengandalkan sektor pertanian untuk menopang perekonomiannya. Dalam kurun waktu kurang dari satu tahun ke depan ASEAN akan memasuki babak baru dalam sejarah organisasi regional tersebut, yaitu pembentukan ASEAN Economic Community. Namun pada kenyataannya, seperti yang sudah digambarkan di atas, walaupun realita di lapangan menunjukkan bahwa sampai saat ini syarat-syarat yang ada masih belum bisa dipenuhi oleh negaranegara anggota ASEAN, para pemimpin ASEAN masih ingin melanjutkan ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) pada tahun D. Narjoko, P. Kartika & T. Wicaksono, Narrowing the Development Gap in ASEAN, dalam M.G Plummer 7 C.S Yue, Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community: A Comprehensive Assesment, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, East- West Center, 2009, p Volume V, Number 2, November

72 B. RUMUSAN MASALAH Berdasarkan latar belakang yang telah diuraikan di atas, rumusan masalah dalam penelitian ini adalah mengapa ASEAN tetap melakukan integrasi ekonomi melalui ASEAN Economic Community pada tahun 2015 walaupun prasyarat sebagai komunitas ekonomi belum terpenuhi? C. KAJIAN PUSTAKA Dengan jumlah penduduk 600 juta, ASEAN dianggap sebagai salah satu kawasan regional yang paling beragam di dunia. ASEAN juga merupakan salah satu kawasan yang paling cepat berkembang di dunia. Sebagai langkah awal, berikut akan dilakukan pemetaan karya akademik terkait dengan integrasi ASEAN dan pembentukan ASEAN Economic Community tahun Pertama, The ASEAN Community; Unblocking the Roadblocks yang dikeluarkan oleh Institute of Southeast Asean Studies Singapore, Buku ini menguraikan bahwa dalam perkembangannya semenjak ASEAN dibentuk, dibutuhkan integrasi ekonomi ASEAN yang lebih mendalam. Hal ini hanya dapat diwujudkan jika ASEAN mempunyai cetak biru dalam mewujudkan dan meningkatkan kerja sama ekonomi regional ASEAN yaitu Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN Kedua, Christopher B. Roberts dalam jurnalnya yang berjudul The ASEAN Community: Trusting Thy Neighbour? yang dikeluarkan oleh Nanyang 10 The ASEAN Community; Unblocking the Roadblocks ASEAN Study Centre report series, no. 1, Institute of Southeast Asean Studies Singapore. Technological University pada tahun Menurut Christopher, ASEAN sebagai organisasi regional yang mempunyai visi untuk mewujudkan komunitas tunggal, melupakan satu hal yang merupakan elemen penting dalam mewujudkan visinya tersebut yakni, faktor kepercayaan antara negara anggota di kawasan ini yang masih belum pernah diteliti. Dalam jurnalnya, Christopher memaparkan hasil survei menunjukkan bahwa kepercayaan masyarakat Asia Tenggara dengan negara tetangganya dapat dikatakan rendah. Gambar 1 menunjukkan sebanyak 37,5 persen responden mengatakan bahwa mereka bisa mempercayai semua negara di Asia Tenggara untuk menjadi tetangga yang baik, sedangkan 36,1 persen dari jumlah responden tidak yakin dan 26,4 persen respon memilih untuk menjawab tidak tahu untuk pertanyaan itu. Seperti yang ditunjukkan pada Gambar 1 Filipina, Malaysia, dan Brunei adalah tiga negara yang dengan persentase tertinggi untuk tingkat kepercayaan kepada negara lain di kawasan Asia Tenggara. Sedangkan tiga negara yang tidak bisa percaya dengan negara-negara lain di Asia Tenggara untuk menjadi tetangga yang adalah Myanmar, Singapura dan Indonesia. Selanjutnya, sejumlah responden yang ada dalam surveinya dikelompokkan menjadi dua bagian yakni antara pejabat pemerintah dan akademisi. Dari hasil survei yang diurai oleh Christopher dalam surveinya dikatakan bahwa akademisi mempunyai pandangan yang yang paling sinis, sekitar 66,7 persen dari mereka menjawab tidak percaya dengan negara lain yang samasama berada di kawasan Asia Tenggara untuk pertanyaan kepercayaan sedangkan 55,3 persen responden dari kelompok pejabat pemerintah menjawab tidak 70 Journal of World Trade Studies

73 Gambar 1. Kepercayaan Masyarakat di Asia Tenggara terhadap Negara Tetangga untuk pertanyaan yang sama. 11 Selanjutnya survei yang dilakukan oleh Christopher berisi pertanyaan lebih lanjut terkait dengan kepercayaan. Responden diminta untuk membayangkan situasi di mana terjadi konflik bersenjata antara dua atau lebih negara-negara ASEAN dalam dua puluh tahun mendatang. Sementara setengah peserta 50 persen menjawab tidak 22,3 persen menjawab ya dan selanjutnya 26,7 persen tidak yakin. Selanjutnya, tabel Gambar 2 menggambarkan persentase pada pertanyaan yang sama berdasarkan kewarganegaraan. Sangat menarik untuk dicatat bahwa responden dari Kamboja 28,6 persen, Thailand 41,7 persen dan Singapura 46,7 persen dianggap mempunyai risiko yang paling tinggi terhadap konflik. 12 Menurut Christopher untuk membentuk sebuah komunitas tunggal atau ASEAN Community, ASEAN terlebih dahulu perlu mengukur persepsi kepercayaan antarnegara anggota. Frekuensi 11 Ibid, hal 3 12 Ibid, hal 4. interaksi yang tinggi antara negara anggota ASEAN ternyata tidak berbanding lurus terhadap tingginya tingkat kepercayaan. Persepsi kepercayaan sa ngat penting untuk dijadikan tolak ukur terwujudnya komunitas tunggal ASEAN karena menurut Christopher sulit untuk membayangkan adanya komunitas ASEAN tanpa adanya kepercayaan yang memadai di kalangan masyarakat negara-negara anggota. 13 Ketiga, Bhattacharyay, Biswa Nath dalam jurnalanya yang berjudul Infrastructure Development for ASEAN Economic Integration. ASEAN mempunyai visi untuk menjadi komunitas ekonomi yang terintegrasi pada Dalam mencapai tujuan menjadikan ASEAN sebagai komunitas ekonomi yang terintegrasi pada 2015, ASEAN mengembangkan kerja sama dalam pembangunan infrastruktur yang bertujuan untuk me 13 Christopher B. Roberts The Asean Community: Trusting Thy Neighbour? Nanyang Technological University. Diakses melalui dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/4283/ rsisc pdf?sequence=2, pada tanggal 21 April Volume V, Number 2, November

74 Gambar 1. Persepsi Elit Mengenai Risiko Konflik di Asia Tenggara ningkatkan konektivitas fisik, khususnya infrastruktur di daerah perbatasan antara negara ASEAN. Jurnal ini memberikan gambaran tentang kuantitas dan kualitas infrastruktur yang ada di negara-negara anggota ASEAN, serta upaya-upaya yang dilakukan ASEAN dalam pembangunan infrastruktur di sektor energi, transportasi dan komunikasi. Selain itu jurnal ini juga meneliti peran, dan kebutuhan pembangunan infrastruktur menuju ASEAN serta membahas isu-isu terkait tantangan yang akan dihadapai oleh negara-negara ASEAN dalam membangun infrastruktur. Jurnal ini juga memberikan perkiraan kebutuhan pembiayaan infrastruktur ASEAN sampai dengan 2015, dan mengidentifikasi cara-cara untuk memenuhi permintaan ini, mengingat krisis ekonomi global saat ini. Pada bagian akhir pemaparan jurnal, terdapat saran terkait dengan langkah-langkah yang seharusnya dilakukan oleh negara-negara anggota ASEAN dalam rangka meningkatkan kerja sama infrastruktur ASEAN untuk mencapai visi utama ASEAN yakni komunitas ekonomi yang terintegrasi tahun Keempat, Soesastro dalam jurnalnya yang berjudul Accelerating ASEAN Economic Integration: Moving beyond AFTA. Salah satu kritik terhadap AEC yang diutarakan oleh Soesastro yang mengamati bahwa proses integrasi ekonomi di ASEAN memerlukan blueprint yang jelas. Tanpa tujuan yang jelas, langkahlangkah yang akan diambil juga menjadi tidak jelas pula. Oleh karena itu tanpa blueprint yang jelas dan hanya berdasar pada AFTA, AEC ini akan sulit tercapai. 15 Namun, pada tahun 2008, blueprint AEC sudah dibuat. AEC Blueprint juga menjadi batu 14 Bhattacharyay, Biswa Nath Infrastructure development for ASEAN economic integration. ADBI working paper series, No. 138 Provided in Cooperation with: Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo. Diakses melalui pada tanggal 22 April H. Soesastro Accelerating ASEAN Economic Integration: Moving beyond AFTA. CSIS Working Paper Series, WPE 091. Diakses melalui pada tanggal 19 Mei 2014, p2. 72 Journal of World Trade Studies